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THE EVOLUTION OF FREE TRADE IN THE
AMERICAS: NAFTA CASE STUDIES
FOREWORD
Claudio Grossman*
The North American Free Trade Agreement will continue to have a
profound impact on the Americas well into the next century. Despite
some early difficulties in implementation, the creation of this regional
trade bloc will, I am confident, produce significant benefits over the
long term. The possible accession of Chile to this agreement, and the
interest of other nations in the hemisphere in this framework illustrate
the importance inter-regional trade will have well into the next century.
These changes will also significantly affect the practice of law as the
distinctions between the international and domestic legal regimes will
become increasingly blurred over time. It is, therefore, vital that the next
generation of practitioners become both comfortable and proficient in
this increasingly interdependent environment.
It is in this environment of increased cooperation that the Washington
College of Law joined together with the University of Ottawa, the
Instituto de Estudios Internacionales of the University of Chile, and the
Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas of the Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Mexico to sponsor a conference entitled: "The Evolution
of Free Trade in the Americas: NAFTA Case Studies." The conference
brought together leading members of the academic, diplomatic, govern-
* Claudio Grossman, Dean, Washington College of Law, American University,
1995-present; Ray Geraldson Scholar for International and Humanitarian Law, Wash-
ington College of Law, American University, 1985-present. President of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, 1996. Acting Dean. Washington College of
Law, American University, 1993-1994; Professor and Director of the International
Legal Studies Program, Washington College of Law, American University, 1983-93.
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ment, and legal communities to discuss the effects of the NAFTA on
three very different economies and cultures. In listening to the panels, I
was impressed by the dynamicism of this new legal regime and the
many challenging and exciting questions the next generation of legal
scholars, practitioners and others will face.
As a result of the conference, the four institutions have agreed to
create an annual event which will be hosted by a different institution
each year. More importantly, the four law schools are exploring the
development of joint programs, exchanges, and other mechanisms to
provide a legal education that meets the challenges of this new econom-
ic reality. If the NAFTA is to truly fulfill its promise, some degree of
integration must take place beyond the economic level. The promotion
of cultural understanding will lead to the creation of a system that pro-
motes not only widespread prosperity, but also the freedom to grow and
prosper in a manner consistent with the norms of justice and human
dignity.
NAFTA CASE STUDIES
INTRODUCTIONS
CLAtIDIo GROSSMAN: All our participants have traveled great distanc-
es to be with us. We are especially pleased to have with us at the table
Dr. Alberto van Klaveren, Director of International Studies at the Uni-
versity of Chile; Dean Louis Perret from the University of Ottawa
School of Law; and Dr. Jose Luis Soberanes, from the Universidad
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM).
I also would like to welcome and thank James Holbein. Professor
Holbein is a professor at the Washington College of Law, and the Unit-
ed States Secretary for the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) Secretariat. This conference is the first of an annual event that
brings together schools located in the capitals of the NAFTA countries
and those countries invited to join the NAFTA, to discuss NAFTA-relat-
ed topics and free trade.
We decided this morning, thanks to UNAM's generosity, that next
year's conference will take place in Mexico City. I also want to share
some of the other ideas for joint programs considered this morning. We
agreed, for example, that a training center run jointly by our four uni-
versities would be instrumental in addressing the need for specialized
interdisciplinary knowledge on NAFTA topics and free trade. So we will
begin preparing a weekly course that will rotate and become an impor-
tant component of joining members of our universities.
We also discussed creating a documentation center that would provide
materials for instructors in our universities addressing NAFTA topics
and general trade issues. We see something very interesting and dynamic
in the association of our four universities, and it is our intention to
develop this relationship as best we can, in order to seize the opportuni-
ties and meet the challenges created by the new global environment.
In our first conference, we are here to explore the various legal as-
pects of the NAFTA, including agriculture, finance and free trade, the
telecommunications revolution in the Americas, and the social aspects of
free trade. We also aim to facilitate relations between the four centers of
learning, research, and study, in hopes of furthering our training and re-
search programs.
Welcome all of you and please allow me now to introduce Dean
Louis Perret of the Civil Law Section of the University of Ottawa
School of Law.
DEAN Louis PERRET: As a partner of this joint venture for the orga-
nization of the Conference on the NAFTA Evolution, I am very honored
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and very pleased to welcome you to this first conference. It is the result
of friendship and academic work. Last year, Dean Claudio Grossman,
with whom I have worked for many years in the context of the Inter-
American Bar Association and Law Professor Association, and I dis-
cussed the idea of a conference to follow up the evolution of the
NAFTA and free trade in the Americas. Thanks to strong links between
friends and friends of friends, namely Claudio Grossman, Alberto van
Klaveren, and Jose Louis Soberanes, we were able to join the efforts of
four leading academic institutions to achieve this goal: The Washington
College of Law in Washington, D.C.; Universidad Nacional Autonoma
de Mexico; El Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de
Chile in Santiago; and the University of Ottawa in Canada.
We hope our efforts will stimulate academic and professional progress
in the NAFTA and the creation of the future Free Trade Areas of the
Americas (FrAA) for the year 2005. We anticipate that this joint ven-
ture will promote a new initiative in our respective universities to
strengthen education for the next generation of legal professionals that
will work in the interdependent environment created by the NAFTA.
I think a mobility program would complement the documentation
center and the training center by facilitating contact between common
law and civil law traditions of the Americas. The law faculty at the
University of Ottawa, which consists uniquely of both a common law
and civil law section, is pleased to welcome you in this regard.
I wish you all a very fruitful and pleasant conference. Naturally, I
thank our host, Dean Claudio Grossman and the Washington College of
Law at American University for this first initiative and also John Izzo
for the organization of the first conference. Thank you very much, merci
beaucoup, muchas gracias.
ALBERTO VAN KLAVEREN: Dear colleagues and friends, let me first
express the deepest appreciation of the Institute of International Studies
of the University of Chile for the opportunity to participate in this new
academic enterprise with such prestigious institutions as the American
University, the University of Ottawa, and the Universidad Autonoma de
Mexico.
Internal economic and political reforms in our countries and the chal-
lenges of globalization are introducing very deep changes in the field of
trade and regional corporate policies. The widening of economic spaces
in many areas of the world is calling into question the existence of what
we used to call national markets.
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Our four countries are participating in new regional and inter-regional
initiatives, including the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which is already a reality for Canada, Mexico, and the Unit-
ed States; APEC; Mercosur, and a series of bilateral agreements, such as
the Chile-Mexico free trade agreement.
Setting up trade and cooperation agreements represents a difficult and
complex process, which requires considerable intellectual support. I
believe that the establishment of a new forum to analyze these initiatives
will be particularly useful and relevant. Our aim should be not only to
follow up and explain trade and integration agreements in our hemi-
sphere but also to produce new ideas which can be policy relevant.
Coming from the most distant country-from a country which is not
yet participating in the NAFTA but which has a very active multi-track
trade policy-I am particularly grateful to the organizers for this invita-
tion. Let me also express my thanks to Dean Grossman and John Izzo
for their support and assistance to the Chilean delegation.
JOSE LuIs SOBERANES: First, I would like to thank Dean Grossman
and the Washington College of Law at American University for organiz-
ing this reunion. This conference is extremely important, not only be-
cause it is a NAFrA event, but also because, once again, academia is
anticipating political development. Five years ago, the four universities
started to analyze the NAFTA before its approval. Similarly, the fact
that Chile is here is proof that we correctly anticipated the forthcoming
accession by Chile into the NAFTA. Even more important is the pros-
pect of collaboration between the four universities in what promises to
be a fruitful relationship. The anticipated continuity in our endeavors
will reflect the profound benefits that academic work can produce for
political actors, economic and social aspects, and all aspects relevant to
the economic integration of the countries involved. This process will
necessarily conclude with the economic integration of all the nations in
the American continents. Thank you very much.
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PANEL I
AGRICULTURE
JAMES HOLBEIN: I appreciate the opportunity to lead this distin-
guished panel today. I am delighted at the turn out. I am currently an
adjunct professor here at American University, Washington College of
Law, and at the Graduate Program of International Studies. I am also
the U.S. Secretary for the NAFTA Secretariat. I am delighted to intro-
duce a very distinguished group of panelists to you today on the subject
of agriculture and the NAFTA.
I also wish to thank Dean Claudio Grossman, Dean Perret, Dr. van
Klaveren and Dr. Soberanes for coming together as a group and bring-
ing you the first multilateral conference that we hope will develop into
quite a cooperative program over the next few years. With that, I will
move right into the presentations by announcing our first speaker. I
would like to save the last fifteen to twenty minutes for questions and
answers.
Our first speaker is Ken Roberts. He is the Assistant Deputy Admin-
istrator for International Trade Policy of the Foreign Agricultural Service
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He is responsible for bilateral
and multilateral agricultural trade policy issues. Previously, he served as
an agricultural officer in London from 1983 through 1987, and prior to
that, worked in the Commodity Marketing Programs and Export Credit
areas of the Foreign Agricultural Service here in Washington. Ken has
a Bachelor's and Master's degree in Agricultural Economics from the
University of Missouri at Columbia and was a Peace Corps volunteer in
Paraguay from 1977 to 1980. Ken will address the topic of the
NAFTA and U.S. agriculture.
KEN ROBERTS: It is a pleasure to be here with you today. It feels
good to back on a university campus, especially this time of year. I
spend a lot of time addressing producer groups around the United States
and have found varying degrees of interest and support for trade initia-
tives. It's a welcome change of pace to address an academic group with
an interest in this work. I am confident the program arranged here
today will further increase your interest and understanding. I hope my
comments will contribute to that end.
In any trade negotiation, the countries involved, or parties to the
negotiation, have to assess their relative economic strengths and weak-
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nesses. The objective is nearly always to increase market access for the
products where a country is most competitive and protect, to the degree
possible, the least competitive products. This is often the negotiating
environment, and the NAFTA was no exception. In agriculture, the
relative competitiveness of a particular commodity or product often
determines the level of public and political interest in the terms of the
negotiation.
For those of you not familiar with agriculture, it is a broad and com-
plex area. In many cases the policies governing agricultural production
and trade are decades old and not easily altered, as required by a free
trade agreement. Agriculture was particularly difficult to negotiate in
NAFTA because of economic and political sensitivity on all these sides
and the comprehensive nature of the agreement. I hope you'll find my
explanation of what took place in this area useful as you look at the
overall agreement. I will try to keep my comments relatively short and
leave time at the end for questions.
The negotiation of agriculture in the NAFTA was somewhat similar to
what took place in the Uruguay Round ("UR"). Remember that the
Uruguay Round was underway as the NAFTA negotiation was initiated
and, therefore, all the parties involved were generally aware of the rules
they would have to comply with in the pending multilateral agreement.
In order to maintain consistency, we borrowed many of the same mod-
els and much of the language of the UR agreement. While the UR was
a broader agreement in terms of policy treatment and disciplines; the
NAFTA was more comprehensive in the elimination of non-tariff mea-
sures and the reduction to zero of all tariffs. This is a useful distinction
to keep in mind as I comment on the NAFTA agriculture negotiation.
The relationship between the UR and the NAFTA is exemplified by
the rules agreed to in the area of sanitary and phytosanitary ("SPS")
measures. SPS was an area where the U.S. and Canada along with
Mexico and others worked diligently during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions to develop rules based on the principle of sound science. That
collective knowledge and experience was brought to the NAFTA negoti-
ation.
SPS became an important element of the final NAFTA agricultural
agreement because with the planned elimination of tariff and non-tariff
barriers, technical barriers, which are not always science-based, remained
the most potentially trade disruptive. The agreement contains the par-
ties' commitment to ensure that any barriers in place at present or erect-
ed in the future are to be based on the principle of sound science. The
NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism provides for a panel of experts to
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determine which barriers will be considered legitimate in the future.
This example reflects a common element of the two trade agreements
and represents a new tool to resolve difficult trade conflicts.
Most of the media coverage as of late focuses on the problems we
are experiencing in trade between our three countries. I will not mini-
mize the problems we have because in many ways they represent the
challenges ahead and a test of strength and commitment to the agree-
ment. But these disagreements underline the close trade relationships
that have been formed and the difficult but rewarding steps we have all
agreed to take to liberalize agricultural trade. It is important to keep in
mind that a lot is going right with the NAFrA in the agricultural area.
Countries and producers in those countries are adjusting to a new
trading environment; a process that takes time. There are many areas of
unimpeded trade, where agricultural goods are flowing more smoothly
than they have at any time in the past. Unfortunately, these success
stories don't receive much public attention.
Another important aspect of the NAFTA, as related to agriculture, is
in the area of export subsidies. This is something that Mexico certainly
has a great interest in, as they do not, in most cases, use export subsi-
dies. Canada and the United States have had differences over the issue
of export subsidies for some time. The U.S. view toward export subsi-
dies in the NAFTA negotiation was that elimination in the context of a
hemispheric agreement was not possible given the continued use of
export subsidies countries outside of the agreement, such as the Europe-
an Union.
We found this point very difficult to address. In fact, what we did
with the text of the NAFTA was agree to language which stated that we
would work toward the elimination of these subsidies and we continue
to do that. The issue of export subsidies is now being taken up in the
broader hemispheric FTAA initiative. Argentina, in particular, is very
active on this front, pushing ahead with ideas and proposals on how
export subsidies can be disciplined. Again, the U.S. is making a genu-
ine effort to work with others toward that goal while, at the same time,
abiding by our commitments made in the UR which limits the use of
export subsidies.
Another area of importance to agriculture is what we pay our produc-
ers internally for a product. This internal subsidy is something that is
of great interest at the moment here in the United States because of the
deliberation of the Farm Bill in Congress. We have explained to our
producers for some time that liberalizing agricultural trade around the
world could help offset the uncertainty of future government support for
[VOL. 11:4694
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agriculture. The NAFTA did little in this area of domestic support,
leaving treatment of these policies to the multilateral UR agriculture
agreement.
The principal area of the NAFTA negotiation in agriculture was mar-
ket access. Here we are talking about tariff negotiations and the remov-
al of non-tariff barriers such as quotas, licensing systems, etc. This was
a difficult area of the agriculture negotiation as there were sensitive
items on all sides. Some of these issues were so sensitive that no fur-
ther negotiation was possible, such as between the U.S. and Canada.
Each country wanted to protect its economically and politically sensitive
products and to establish the longest transition period possible. This
was accomplished, certainly in the case of both Mexico and the United
States by some lengthy tariff phase-outs of about ten to fifteen years.
There were also safeguards put into place, like tariff rate quotas de-
signed to allow for an orderly transition and help prevent surges in
trade.
Unfortunately, in the first couple of years of the NAFTA implementa-
tion we have experienced broad trade swings in agriculture goods. U.S.
exports shot up the first year followed by the peso devaluation which
favored Mexican exports the next year. Both sides would like to see
smoother trade patterns develop in the future; this is expected to occur
under the terms of the agreement The immediate challenge to the gov-
ernments of all three countries is not to allow circumstances beyond the
scope of the NAFTA to undermine potential future trade benefits.
These circumstances are often beyond anyone's control and next to im-
possible to predict. We feel that over time all three parties will derive
benefits from more liberalized trade and that the agricultural sectors can
complement one another if the terms of trade are conducted fairly.
I will not go into detail on the subject of the Canada-U.S. trade
agreement because Mr. Miner will address this relationship in his pre-
sentation. We did very little in the NAFTA with the existing FTA with
Canada leaving the agreement less than comprehensive in nature. There
are certain industries that were excluded from NAFTA liberalization on
both the U.S. and Canadian sides. In the case of Mexico, we went the
full distance to free trade. Now the U.S. and Mexico are on a glide
path toward free trade and we think that it is the right way to go. Our
agreement with Mexico on agriculture is a model that could be used for
future trade agreements either in the context of NAFTA accession or the
FTAA.
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JAMES HOLBEIN: Thank you very much Ken. I appreciate very much
your remarks on the United States perspective. One of the reasons 'this
topic is on the agenda for the day is that agricultural disputes have been
very prominent under the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement, and I
think, perhaps, will continue to be so under the NAFTA. In my experi-
ence under Chapter 19, we have had panel reviews on apples, beer, pork
and swine products, and lumber. Then, under Chapter 18 of the FTAA,
we covered meat, milk and somewhat related agricultural products, like
fisheries products of salmon, herring and lobsters. So it has been a
fairly prominent sector.
Our next speaker, Mr. Bill Miner, is uniquely qualified to discuss
both the trade policy aspects and perhaps even some of the disputes that
have arisen. Bill Miner is currently a private trade consultant and se-
nior research associate with the Center for Trade Policy and Law at the
University of Ottawa. He has also previously worked at the Institute for
Research on Public Policy. He has been a coordinator for the Federal
Advisory Group on Grains, and has served a long, distinguished career
with the Canadian Foreign Service and various trade policy branches of
the Federal Department of Industry Trade and Commerce.
Bill is former Chairman of the International Wheat Council, past
Director of the Canadian International Grains Institute, and is the Direc-
tor of a newly organized International Policy Council on Agriculture,
Food, and Trade. He was head of the delegation from Canada for the
GATT trade negotiations and has spoken and written extensively on
agriculture and grain trade matters.
Mr. Miner is currently the Canadian Co-Chair of the Canada/U.S.
Joint Commission on Grains, which is very important in the consultation
process established between the two countries.
He will be speaking to us now on agricultural policies in a free trade
agreement.
WILLIAM MINER: I find myself in a bit of a time warp, on the
wrong end of the time. The university was one of the best parts of my
career and, I am sure, in your case, it is as well. In fact, I would love
to have a little more time to look around this university. It is very
attractive, particularly on a day like this.
My topic this morning varies from that of the original program for
two reasons. First, I am acting currently in the capacity as a Co-Chair
of the Joint Grain Commission. I thought it might be useful to bring a
bit of experience to this meeting in the sense of a case study. In addi-
tion, the supply management issue, as you know, is going to a NAFTA
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panel. It is therefore going to be a legal situation. I very much prefer
to avoid going into the substance of those issues ahead of a panel's
activity.
Ken Roberts, in his opening comments mentioned that he was an
attach6 in London back in the 1980s. I was there in the same capacity
in the 1960s, which is further evidence of the time warp. What I find
interesting, however, is that in respect to the cereal sector, at least, the
issues that we addressed in the 1980s, and certainly in the 1960s and
even in the 1950s, are still with us.
So some of these problems are rather enduring and require an ex-
tremely deliberate approach. Trade agreements are helpful. But, in a
sense, what I am going to talk about is the ongoing agenda, under the
agreements between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. We do
have problems, and seek to deal with them. In a sense, it is another
phase of what needs to be done to achieve what we all agree is a very
desirable objective-establishing a Free Trade Area in the hemisphere.
What I will be saying can be treated more as an example of how the
agricultural sector is being addressed. My comments are not intended to
imply that I do not believe that movements in this direction are, in fact,
very desirable. This is where we are both coming from, on both sides
of the border. As you will see in my comments, this is really where
our Commission is coming from as well.
However, as has been indicated, when you look at agriculture in a
free trade scenario, and I do not think it matters whether it is a Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the United States, or the
NAFTA involving three countries, or a broadening of the NAFTA,
which is now underway, or for that matter, any other Free Trade Area
or trade arrangement, agriculture always seems to stand out significantly
as a challenge.
If you look at the FTA, as Ken Roberts indicated, we made only
modest progress in some parts of that agreement. Many of the border
restraints were there when that negotiation began, and in a sense, are
continuing. They are related largely to the types of internal programs
that Canada and the United States are maintaining, or have in the past
maintained. So when the countries announced that they had a free trade
agreement, which indeed they did by all proper definitions, there was
nonetheless a significant part of trade that still faced border restraint.
The agreement has a very large chapter dealing with agriculture, and
it really boils down to rather exceptional treatment for that sector. The
FTA, or now the NAFTA, calls for the removal of tariffs on
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cross-border trade in agricultural products. That is a major accomplish-
ment.
It moves in the right direction in terms of free trade. The Cana-
da/U.S. arrangement came close to achieving the basis, and I want to
emphasize that, for free trade in the red meat sector, in oil seeds, in
cereals, and in many of our agricultural products. There were, however,
important sectors, such as dairy, which both countries more or less
wished to leave off the table. The United States wanted sugar and
peanuts off the table and Canada held poultry aside. There were excep-
tions and safeguards effecting a range of other agricultural and food
products. Progress was made in how to handle disputes and settle them.
But, clearly, trade tensions are continuing and our agenda in cereals is
part of that continuation.
When the NAFTA was concluded, the situation was not much differ-
ent. In effect, there are three bilateral agreements for agriculture under
the NAFTA umbrella. The Canada/U.S. bilateral was continued, and
was in fact, related to what was going on in the Uruguay Round. The
Canada/Mexico arrangement continued further, but not by much more
than the Canada/U.S. bilateral. When you look at the U.SJMexican
bilateral, however, negotiations extend significantly beyond what the two
countries managed to do on their own. In my mind, this is a credit to
the Mexican administration and probably a tribute to the negotiating
leverage of the United States.
In any event, the U.SiMexican bilateral agreement did establish the
basis for virtual free trade in agricultural products between those two
countries under certain transitional arrangements which can extend for
up to fifteen years. Mexico gave a little more on sugar in order to get
the NAFTA ratified. I only mention that to indicate that these sectors
are rather sensitive and difficult and require hands-on management in
the free trade scenario.
I think the situation is similar with regional free trade arrangements
elsewhere. The reason is fairly obvious. Agricultural policies are de-
signed to meet domestic, economic and social objectives. For the most
part, border restrictions in this sector are put in place as extensions of,
or in support of, those domestic policies. When agricultural export
subsidies are practiced, they are practiced primarily to move surplus
product, which, at least in part, is due to the internal price supports and
other internal mechanisms designed to support the sector.
Import restrictions are used to protect farm support policies and other
forms of market interventions. So it is not really surprising, when you
look at the issues that we are grappling with, that they have their roots
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in the types of policies that we maintain internally in support of the
sector. This is possibly more of a comment from the northern hemi-
sphere than from the southern hemisphere where fewer import restric-
tions exist related to domestic subsidies. In fact, the southern hemi-
sphere uses agriculture as a base for economic development.
The point is that the policies are in place internally and the border
arrangements are there to back them up. Making significant progress on
the border difficulties requires grappling with the policy problems at
home. Generally, trade agreements, at least in the agricultural experi-
ence, are more of a response to what is happening in the market and
the way that the industry itself is changing. This exists at the primary
level and up through the other levels of the industry so that agreements
are really seeking to bring the arrangements of the border in-line with
the way in which the markets are evolving internationally and, of
course, what is going on within the industry at home.
Now, progress was made in the Uruguay Round in dealing with agri-
cultural subsidies and in converting non-tariff barriers to tariffs. But, of
course, that result is not yet free trade. So, there is a formidable chal-
lenge for agriculture.
If you then look at what we, as a Commission, were seeking to do, it
becomes apparent that we were trying to grapple with the policy differ-
ences of two countries. In addition the problems relate to competition
between the countries in the cereal industries, exacerbated by their close
proximity (right across the border); similar means of production; com-
petitors in international markets; and increased trade with one another.
Incidentally, trade is growing in both directions in the cereal sector.
Trade between Canada and the United States is not that unbalanced if
you look at the total spectrum of cereal trade, including products deter-
mined by value. Lack of balance is more pronounced, particularly on
the United States side, in raw grains, like wheat and barley.
The Commission that I am currently a part of was established a year
ago under a one-year memorandum of understanding between the United
States and Canada. It seeks to manage the aforementioned issues, and
particularly to find long-term solutions to the problems of competition in
the grain sector. We aimed to assist the governments in establishing
what was clearly identified as solutions that should last. We agreed
from the beginning that we should concentrate on a more open and
equitable trading arrangement between the two countries.
We were working within the contractual arrangements and in line
with the objectives of the NAFTA and GATT. We concluded that these
efforts are timely, with the general environment of policy change, driven
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largely, but not solely by, budgets and developments within the industry.
The market is strengthening and changing so that these types of inter-
ventions are less needed and, in fact, less practiced. It is timely for
governments to address issues of this nature, at least regarding cereals.
The recommendations of this ten-member Commission came out in an
interim manner in June 1995. We are now in the process of trying to
finalize our report, which will be out shortly. It is, in fact, past due.
We are trying to describe, for general readership: the nature of the is-
sues that we were dealing with; the way that we approached them; the
measures we used, which one might broadly refer to as fair trade; and
the types of recommendations that we arrived at and why. In particular,
we are urging the two governments to undertake a regular, structured,
consultative process to reduce these trade difficulties. We believe that
our report will identify sector by sector, in the sense of the industry, an
agenda with which they can work. It is also true, of course, that some
of the more difficult issues are multilateral issues. This requires that
other countries be involved.
I am not going to talk in any detail about the elements of the result.
It should be available to you if you wish to read it. Our focus is on
the cross-border trade issue. This relates largely to the northern tier
states and, of course, to the western part of Canada, where production is
somewhat similar and where the political side of the issue became rather
intense.
Our conclusion here was as follows: while the flow of trade is grad-
ually improving both ways as a result of a more open border scenario,
free trade irritants continue to exist as a result of both unusual market
conditions and policy differences. These conditions developed partly
from a damaged crop on the Canadian side and partly from difficulties
on the United States side in grain supplies. There was a surge of
movement that turned these trade irritants into a full-blown dispute,
which became quite acute and highly politicized. The dispute needed
direct attention. Canada and the United States, therefore, chose to de-
velop the Joint Commission to address these issues.
It is important to recognize, as well, that there are policy reasons
behind this dispute. There are also regulatory differences across the
border, which are somewhat responsible for what is occurring. This is
not just a question of unusual market conditions. The problem is that
these localized difficulties get blown out of proportion if there is not a
hands-on approach for dealing with them directly.
In our view an industry-based approach was preferable to government
involvement. Governments might well be involved with recommenda-
[VOL. 11:4
NAFTA CASE STUDIES
tions, but the industry would follow the trade and determine the reasons
why developments were variable, and why issues were emerging and
needed to be handled.
Obviously, those sorts of problems, in our view, need careful atten-
tion. We believe that an industry-based Consulting Committee is the
right way to go. Here, we are talking, of course, about producers, as
well as members of the industry at the processing level or the trading
level.
We then looked at grading and regulatory issues. Without getting
into a lot of detail, we found differences in the way we grade; differ-
ences in the way we measure; different specifications within the grade;
and differences in the way we actually identify the quality of the grain.
All of these contributed to the problem. Our recommendation was to
move towards a common science of measurement to overcome differenc-
es in interpretation, but we did not seek to harmonize our regulations
and grades. We looked closely at the infrastructure, for ways to
interrelate systems, such as the railways, so as to improve conditions for
competition across the border where areas were, in a sense, dependent
upon a rail line or a form of movement. The countries should coordi-
nate improving conditions of competition and regulatory enforcement.
We looked then at the very difficult area of domestic support policies
and export systems. On the domestic support side, when the actual
level of transfer of income support is extreme within the two countries,
trade is clearly influenced. The answer probably lies in following the
scenario of moving towards what we call "green" policies-policies that
do not have an impact on what you produce or what you do with it.
But, this is a longer term activity.
The Farm Bill debate in the United States is underway right now, and
we really could not come to grips with specific policy modifications.
Regardless, we agreed that if we want to get rid of export subsidies, we
must remove subsidies that have a direct production and trade effect at
the domestic level. This requires that we are disciplined on discretion-
ary pricing, where it creates extreme conditions of competition. This
was the right way to go to reduce the severe competitive difficulties
between the two countries, not only in the two markets, but offshore
and in third countries.
Now, we have completed our work. We are in the process of trying
to describe the nature of our discussions and the rationale for the rec-
ommendations. The ministers, who are directly concerned, have been
briefed about our conclusions and recommendations. We are confident
that the report will assist in overcoming some of these conflicts and
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improve trade generally. Perhaps, our experience in dealing with this
sector will prove useful in preparing to handle issues of this nature in
other parts of our trade.
JAMEs HOLBEIN: Thank you very much, Bill. That was very
thoughtful coverage. I look forward to seeing the report of the Com-
mission when it is finally released.
It is important to note that under the NAFTA the number of disputes
has actually decreased from the number of trade disputes under the
U.S./Canada FTA. In less than two years, we have reduced the number
of these agricultural disputes. I hope this is a trend that we will see
continue under the NAFTA and certainly as we evolve into the FTAA.
I would like to introduce our next speaker, who is going to talk to us
about agriculture and the NAFTA from the Mexican perspective.
Bryan Elwood Salido is First Secretary at the Embassy of Mexico
here in Washington, D.C. He holds a Law Degree from the
Iberoamericana University of Mexico City and has a Masters in Law
from Georgetown University. He has also obtained credits at the Uni-
versity of Vienna in Austria, Harvard University in Boston, and McGill
University in Montreal.
Mr. Salido has worked with the law firm of Galldstegui, Nettel y
Asociados in Mexico City, and has been with the Government of Mexi-
co as Chief of the International Legal Department and also as Deputy
Director of International Organizations of the General Bureau of Foreign
Investment of the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development.
We are very privileged to have him here to discuss Mexico and agricul-
ture.
BRYAN ELWOOD SALIDO: I would like to talk about Mexico's com-
mercial strategy, about the NAFTA and how agricultural legislation in
Mexico has developed in the past few years.
Since 1986, with Mexico's accession to the GATr, the country's over-
all economic strategy has focused on participating more actively in
international and hemispheric trade. Today, Mexico has signed several
trade agreements. Mexico joined the NAFTA with the United States
and Canada to create the largest consumer market. Mexico has also
signed agreements with Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Costa
Rica, and is currently negotiating agreements with other countries such
as Nicaragua and El Salvador. Mexico is part of the APEC and is also
a member of the OECD. As a result, trade between Mexico and other
countries has increased substantially. Mexico's export market is current-
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ly above $80 billion, and the country imports over $70 billion worth of
goods.
For Mexico the most significant growth in trade has come through its
NAFTA partners. At the end of 1994, three-way trade amongst Mexico,
the United States, and Canada stood at $344 billion, an increase of 17%
from 1993.
Regarding U.S and Mexico, in the NAFTA's first year of implementa-
tion trade between them jumped 23%--from $88.1 billion to $106.4 bil-
lion-with neither country substantially importing more than the other.
United States exports to Mexico grew from $48 billion in 1993 to $51.6
billion in 1994, and United States imports grew from $45.3 billion to
$54.8 billion.
Historically, trade between Mexico and Canada has been small, but it
is evident that both countries have begun to explore and take advantage
of the opportunities that the NAFTA provides. Mexico's main exports
to Canada include: auto parts, engines, computer, coffee, guavas, grapes,
and mangoes.
To the south, Mexico has a well-established commercial relationship
with Chile through the Mexico-Chile Free Trade Agreement. Bilateral
trade has grown since the agreement at an average annual rate of 45%.
In addition, exports have increased, with respect to Mexico, 145% from
1994-95. This is a $235.7 million increase in Mexican exports for
1995. In addition to trading, Chile has invested in Mexican fruit and
Mexico has invested in Chilean textiles, petrochemicals, and furniture
industries. We expect that investment will increase as trade increases
between both nations. Hopefully, Chile will be able to join the NAFTA
in the near future,
The NAFTA guarantees its signatories market access and fair rules.
Regarding agriculture, the NAFTA provides safeguard provisions, export
subsidy provisions, and, overall, establishes rules to do business on a
fair level. The agreement also provides for the application of each
country's international trade laws to agricultural products. Under the
NAFTA, domestic producers who feel they are being injured because of
imports coming from another NAFTA Party may request the initiation of
an antidumping or a countervailing duty investigation. Furthermore,
under Chapter 19, antidumping and countervailing duty final determina-
tions may be subjected to a panel review.
We only have one international trade case against Mexico in the
United States-a dumping case concerning flowers. As you know, once
a dumping margin has been established for the first time, a review may
be requested every year thereafter. In order to revoke an investigation
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exporters must obtain a zero rate margin during three consecutive yearly
reviews.
In the case of Canada and Chile, we do not have any trade cases
regarding agriculture. In fact, Mexico has only fourteen cases world-
wide.
Prior to and after the NAFTA, Mexico made important modifications
to its laws on agriculture in order to become a viable, competitive na-
tion. Mexico totally revamped its legislation in some areas.
Some of the laws that have changed in Mexico address ownership of
land. Mexican post-revolutionary laws created the "ejido" which aimed
at distributing the land, mostly in small plots, between the communal
farmers. This program, unfortunately, in many cases, has not allowed
farmers to compete effectively in the international market. Thus, the
past administration began a serious and intense program to allow for the
privatization, at the farmer's choice, of the land. Legislation allowed
much of the land under the program to be sold or leased. This is help-
ing Mexico's agricultural industry become a little more competitive. But
there is still a lot to do. Also, only 12% of Mexico has adequate rain-
fall. Mexico is a large producer and exports several products world-
wide, such as tomatoes, avocados, and tropical fruits, among others.
Under the new Foreign Investment Law, we are trying to advocate
stronger investment in these areas. In the area of technology, Mexico
has fallen behind its competitors in the United States. Mexico has
opened the agricultural activities to foreign private investment.
In accordance with the NAFTA, Mexico allows 100% foreign invest-
ment in agriculture. It does, however, limit the amount of land that can
be purchased by a foreign company. Under the new agricultural law,
agro-industrial corporations must emit a special series of stock, called
series "T" shares, that represent the value of the land as part of the
assets of the company. Foreign investors can own up to 49% of these
series "T" shares. Foreigners may own 100% of all other shares of the
company.
Basically, Mexico's challenge is to become more competitive in the
agro-industry by attracting investment and technology transfer and open-
ing new markets for the products that it produces best. This should
bring badly needed development to some areas of Mexico. Through
trade with the United States, Canada and possibly Chile, via the NAFTA
framework, Mexico is becoming more competitive in the international
arena.
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JAMES HOLBEIN: Thank you very much. As we conceded, agricul-
ture is a very important sector in the evolution of free trade in the
Americas and in the Western hemisphere. It will be a very important
area of negotiation for Chile's entry into the NAFTA and, of course, the
expansion of the NAFTA into, ultimately, the free trade agreement of
the Americas.
We are very fortunate to have with us Dr. Eduardo Santos to discuss
Chilean agriculture in the NAFrA. Dr. Santos is the Agricultural
Attach6 at the Embassy of Chile here in Washington, D.C., and was
previously the Agricultural Attach6 at the Chilean Mission to the Euro-
pean Union in Brussels. He is on leave of absence from the Center for
Development Studies of the University of Wales Swansea in the United
Kingdom, where he has been teaching and researching since 1981.
Before his appointment to Brussels, he was also Director of the Master's
Degree Program in Food Policy and Commodity Trade.
In the 1970s, Dr. Santos worked at the Catholic University of Chile
in Santiago, and was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of De-
velopment Studies at the University of Sussex in England. He is a
graduate of the Catholic University of Chile and has pursued
post-graduate studies at the University of California, Berkeley (Master's
Degree) and obtained a Ph.D. at the University of Sussex on the subject
of the United States Agricultural System and Food Trade. He has also
worked as a consultant on several projects for the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the U.N. (FAO) and the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) in both Latin America and the Caribbean and
Africa. He is the author of numerous articles and essays and of two
books on the issues of agriculture, agricultural policy, and food trade.
We are indeed fortunate to have him with us here today.
EDUARDO SANTOS: Thank you very much for your kind presentation.
I am pleased to have been invited and to have the opportunity to share
some of my views and experience throughout these years. I will not be
able to talk very much about the NAFTA, since Chile is not yet a
member of the Agreement. I have therefore organized a few comments
on three different topics, which I would like to explain to you before I
get into the actual details of my presentation.
The first one deals with Chile. Chile is a small country in South
America. Why is Chile concerned with and important to trade in North
America? I will try to offer a few answers to this question. I will
also address the issue of agriculture in Chile. Agriculture has been an
integral part of Chile's success over the last two decades. Agriculture
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has also contributed to the growth of industry in the country and it
should not be asked to pay for the liberalization process. Agriculture is
prepared to change, but it has already paid a significant price and now
is the time to invest in the sector in order to secure its modernization.
Finally, I will deal with our possible membership in the NAFTA, pre-
senting what I believe are some of the key issues that have been dis-
cussed in Chile in connection with this negotiation.
Today, Chile is the most open market and possibly the most stable
economy in Latin America. This has been achieved through developing
an open economy for the last twenty years but we still expect to
strengthen economic and political links with the three main world trad-
ing blocks. We are already either negotiating with, or are a part of, the
three main trading blocks. We are negotiating with the NAFTA and we
have been invited to negotiate with the European Union. Closer eco-
nomic and political links are possible.
Chile is a member of APEC, and we are also negotiating a trade
agreement with MERCOSUR, the largest trading block in South Ameri-
ca. In addition, Chile has signed, since the beginning of this decade,
economic cooperation agreements with Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador,
and it has also negotiated free trade agreements with Mexico, Venezuela,
and Colombia. Chile has been at the forefront of trade liberalization for
the Latin American region.
Since the mid-1970s, Chile has eliminated all of its non-tariff barriers
to trade. Our constitution prohibits non-tariff barriers to trade and since
the mid-1980s tariff rates have been falling regularly. In 1985, they fell
from 35% to 30%, and then to 20%. In 1988, they fell to 15%. Since
1991, with only a few exceptions, tariffs have been at 11%. Our export
policies are consistent with our open economy. There are no export
taxes and Chile does not subsidize exports.
Chile also welcomes foreign investment, on non-discriminatory terms,
in all sectors of the economy. We have significantly improved the
protection of intellectual property rights and have signed all international
agreements on patents. Moreover, Chile is developing important laws to
protect and develop the environment.
In terms of economic performance, Chile is now in its twelfth consec-
utive year of economic growth. Chile has grown at an average annual
rate of over 6% since 1984 and we expect the same growth rate this
year. In 1994, inflation was around 8.9%, the lowest in twenty-four
years, and we expect similar figures this year. Additionally, exports
have grown from about $3.8 billion in the mid-1980s to almost $12
billion last year.
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This explains, to some extent, why Chile has been invited to become
a member of the NAFTA. If Chile does not reach this status, it will be
difficult for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) to materialize.
We believe Chile is possibly the best candidate to initiate its expansion
toward the South.
What is the role of agriculture in the performance of the Chilean
economy? Agriculture contributes 7-8% of the GDP, but it contributes
to almost 40% of our exports. We also have a surplus of nearly $2.5
billion in agricultural trade. This is a significant achievement, with only
16.5% of the Chilean population and some 16% of the labor force
working in agriculture.
Several factors contribute to the growth, development, and success of
Chilean agriculture. First, I believe that the roots of the modernization
of Chilean agriculture are based firmly on the agrarian reform process
that took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, during the administra-
tions of President Frei and President Allende. Agrarian reform contrib-
uted to the dismantling of the old agrarian structures and facilitated the
development of modem agriculture, the introduction of new technology,
and the development of viable-productive units in Chilean agriculture.
A second factor is the savings and investment generated by economic
stability over the last fifteen years. Land tenure security is another im-
portant factor that has promoted investment and the introduction of new
technology. Advantageous climate conditions also give us a competitive
edge in the world market, as does the willingness of Chilean entrepre-
neurs to take risks. Low labor costs have also contributed to our com-
petitiveness in the international market. These are some of the major
factors behind the development and expansion of agricultural exports in
Chile.
Today, Chile is a major force in off-season fruit exports and is a
major supplier of some commodities to the United States and the Euro-
pean Union. Agriculture has contributed to the diversification of the
Chilean economy. Twenty or thirty years ago, the Chilean economy
was primarily dependent on exports of raw materials like copper. To-
day, Chile offers a diversified basket of products.
Chile has also diversified its markets. It exports approximately
one-third to Europe, one-third to the Americas, and one-third to the
Pacific region. This development of Chilean agriculture has also con-
tributed to the modernization of other sectors. Agriculture and the
development of export infrastructure play a major role in Chile's eco-
nomic success.
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There is, however, another aspect to this spectacular growth in Chil-
ean agriculture. Production for export remains highly concentrated,
involving only a few countries and few products. I refer to this as the
"apple and grape syndrome." That is, most of our apples are exported
to the European Union and most of our grapes are exported to the
United States. At the same time, grapes are our primary export to the
United States and apples are our primary export to the European Union.
Despite the fact that our agricultural exports are fairly diversified, trade
still tends to be concentrated in only a few countries and a few prod-
ucts.
I further believe that the development of Chilean agriculture endangers
the food security of the Chilean population, by making us more depen-
dent on basic food imports. I am not referring to self-sufficiency, but to
the wider concept of food security. Modernization has not spread
throughout Chilean agriculture. There are significant developments and
improvements taking place, but pockets of poverty exist. The revolution
of Chilean agriculture still has to reach those areas. There is great
concern for the 15% of the Chilean population whose living and work-
ing conditions are sub-standard. Those affected are primarily peasants,
small producers, wage laborers, and women working in the processing
and fruit export businesses.
With regard to Chilean accession to the NAFT'A, Chile has been at
the forefront of the liberalization of agricultural trade. Chile joined the
Cairns Group from the outset, in the mid-1980s, and has been instru-
mental in liberalizing agricultural trade. The Group played a major role,
jointly with the United States, in opening up international agricultural
markets. We work closely with Canada, who is also a member of the
Cairns group.
Chile has decided to liberalize agriculture and to open and integrate
its economy into the world market. Nonetheless, Chilean authorities
have also decided that Chilean agriculture cannot be put at risk against
unfair competition, subsidized products, and the distortion that still exists
in international markets. We continue to fight for trade liberalization,
but opening the more sensitive areas of Chilean agriculture will take
place only gradually, as was the case with developed countries. Al-
though we cannot subsidize our exports, it is only fair to protect those
agricultural areas that are hurt by unfair practices.
Chileans see the challenge of NAFTA trade liberalization in different
ways. While there are certain disagreements on where to move and
how fast to move, there is agreement on the main objectives. First, that
we need to open more markets and diversify trade, and second that we
708 [VOL. 11:4
NAFTA CASE STUDIES
should add value to our exports. We cannot continue to only export
commodities. The same markets are covered by several countries, while
food consumption in the developed nations is only growing slowly.
Chile needs to diversify in a different direction. Everyone is following
the Chilean model and most Latin American countries have followed
developments in our agricultural sector closely. We cannot continue to
export only primary products, but must add value to our agricultural
exports.
It is also generally agreed that agriculture should not bear the cost of
trade liberalization, and that we cannot continue to expel people from
the countryside. Conditions for investment and new job opportunities in
strategic areas must first be established. Greater balanced territorial
development within the Chilean economy is also necessary, as is the
need to guarantee the resources to continue modernizing agriculture, so
as to ensure that modernization takes place in all areas of Chilean agri-
culture.
With regard to exports, the NAFTA is our main trade partner in agri-
cultural products. We export some $900 million in agricultural
products, including forestry products. Most of this goes to the United
States. The European Union is almost as important as the NAFTA
countries, as it imports some $680 million.
Japan is also a significant source of income for us-about $450 mil-
lion. The MERCOSUR countries have increased trade with Chile, con-
tributing to the liberalization efforts within both MERCOSUR and Chile.
But, the NAFTA is where the greatest proportion of agricultural trade
occurs. Our main trading partner is the United States. Here, trade
tends to be concentrated on one single product: grapes. We have a
fairly diversified list of agro-industrial exports, but they also tend to be
concentrated primarily in wines and canned products.
How is Chilean accession to the NAFTA likely to affect Chilean
agriculture? There have been two or three different studies, and they
tend to agree on the basic features of trade liberalization in Chilean
agriculture. A key conclusion is that the effect will be important. It is
a matter of opinion as to whether those effects will be positive or nega-
tive. It seems that there are no major losses or benefits in terms of
trade with the NAFTA. There may be some losses in certain sectors
and benefits in terms of jobs in other sectors of Chilean agriculture, but
there is no doubt that production, economic structures and the use of
land are going to change significantly. Generally, studies predict that
wine, agro-industry, and seed exports will benefit from the liberalization
of trade. Most of Chilean fruit exports to the NAFTA take place under
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no tariff. Therefore, the NAFTA should not impact fruit trade in Chile.
There are, however, other sectors that will be affected, and this is why
food security becomes an issue. Many sectors are under strong pressure
in this regard, including, cereal production, grains, and oil seeds. It is
difficult to anticipate the outcome. The majority of studies completed
have been based on major assumptions.
In my own career I have seen hundreds of different econometric
models attempting to depict how trade would change with the Uruguay
Round, with the NAFTA, and other trading blocks. All of these models
involved broad assumptions and offered only general conclusions. There
are too many unknown factors and thus, it is very difficult to estimate
what the long-term developments are going to be.
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FINANCE AND FREE TRADE
SERGIO LOPEZ-AYLLON: Our next speaker is Javier Medina. Javier
is a graduate from University of Madrid in Spain, and has held several
positions in the Ministry of the Government of Mexico. He was also
Chief of Staff of the Mexican Embassy in Madrid.
JAVIER MEDINA: First of all, let me thank you for the invitation and
for the opportunity to discuss such an important subject, as is the evolu-
tion of the Mexican economy. The Mexican economy has become a
very important topic, not only for the Mexicans, but for the rest of the
Latin American countries, as well as for United States markets, United
States tax payers, and for some international financial institutions here in
Washington, DC.
In just a few years, Mexico has become a text book example of what
should and should not be done in terms of economic policy.
During the last ten years, the Mexican economy has suffered a very
important transformation. After various decades of an import substitu-
tion policy, the Mexican government decided to open the economy, to
reduce the public deficit, to renegotiate public debt, and most important-
ly to change the role of the State in the economy. We were able to
change the patterns of growth, based upon a different economic model
(trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization). Mexico rapidly
emerged as the most successful transitional market-oriented economy.
We were the text book example. Many people all over the world be-
lieve that Mexico was the model for economic adjustment in developing
countries, not only in the academic arena, but in the government, so
Mexico was able to reach one of the best economic images in the
world.
But this was not only a matter of image, Mexico suffered, as I said,
an extremely important economic transformation between 1988 and
1994, that gave confidence to the international markets.
From 1990-93, the United States and other foreign investors moved
more than $90 billion into Mexico. These were not bank loans, but
purchases of stocks and bonds, combined with a few fixed investments,
such as hotels and factories. By 1993, the Mexican economy seemed to
be in good financial shape: inflation was low and the government ran a
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budget surplus, compared with a budget deficit that rose almost 70% of
GDP in 1982.
Difficulties in the government, however, began precisely because their
reforms were so successful. The fact that Mexico was a textbook exam-
ple made it possible for the Mexican authorities to rely, in my opinion,
to much, on foreign savings.
Much has been said about the origins of the Mexican crisis. Far
from getting into speculation, I would say that the crisis responded to a
combination of both internal and external factors. Amongst the first,
one can point to the unfortunate political events that dominated Mexico
during 1994, such as the rebellion in the southern state of Chiapas, the
assassination of prominent political figures, and even the uncertainty
leading up to what turned out to be Mexico's fairest and most transpar-
ent electoral process.
On the economic front, a series of factors contributed to the crisis.
Mexico incurred very high current account deficits, reaching $28 billion
in 1994 (8% of GDP). At the same time, it was clear that the peso
was overvalued and that some adjustment in the exchange rate had to
take place sooner or later.
External factors also played a role in sparking the economic crisis of
Mexico. Amongst these one can mention the continued rise in interest
rates in the United States and also the nature of portfolio management
by foreign investors. Together with the internal factors mentioned earli-
er, this led to an erosion of confidence in the Mexican economy, thus
contributing to its downhill turn after the devaluation of December 20,
1994.
The Government of Mexico has recognized that the crisis stems both
from errors in the instrumentation of the economic model and a surpris-
ing reaction by the markets that compounded upon them. For example,
on the day of the devaluation, December 20, 1994, nearly $4 billion left
the country. Because of this type of reaction, the devaluation in De-
cember turned dramatic as it developed into a deep economic crisis with
far reaching consequences. At the core of this crisis was, and is, a
problem of confidence that has proved to be the main stumbling block
in controlling the economy.
Our government believed these problems to be temporary and, there-
fore, resolved not to change the monetary policy, but instead attempted
to relieve the pressures on the exchange rate by creating new debt in-
struments denominated in dollars. The decision not to increase interest
rates and to avoid pressure surrounding the peso was, in my opinion,
politically motivated.
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The Mexican Government had the important objective of prevailing in
the 1994 presidential election. The problem was not just the size of the
current account deficit, but it included figuring out a way to finance the
deficit. Instead of increasing interest rates, reducing credit and dimin-
ishing liquidity in the economy, the government decided to rely on
dollar denominated debt as a way to maintain economic activity.
We sought aid from financial institutions, and, in response, the United
States Government offered an important package of S20 billion that
helped not only to reduce pressure on the exchange rate, but also as-
sured that many people in the United States were able to get their mon-
ey back.
We applied a bitter medicine: 50% increase in value added tax, 35%
increase in electricity and gas, 10% decrease in public expenditure and a
restrictive monetary policy. This is the classical adjustment program,
which leads to a tremendous reduction in consumption and, of course, to
a deep recession. The medicine may have been too strong for the pre-
carious conditions of the Mexican population. We do not know the
extent of damage to the banking system. The government is trying to
apply measures which will reduce the possibility of defaults in the bank-
ing system. They have been successful up to now. We have observed
the main position of the government to be: the harder the adjustment
program, the shorter the recession.
There are social obligations as well. Overall, we have seen positive
signs. Reserves, for example, have recuperated from $6.1 million to
$15 million last week; interest rates have fallen from 100% to 34% this
week; the exchange rate has almost stabilized from eight pesos per
dollar four months ago, to 6.4 pesos per dollar, and public instruments
have diminished from $30 billion by the end of December, 1994, to a
little more than $2 billion by the end of September, 1995.
Crisis management in the financial sector has been successful. We
have also been able to return to the financial markets, although we have
placed only slightly more than $3 billion there. After the 1982 crisis, it
took us almost five years to return to the financial markets. In this
crisis, and I think because of the strong adjustment process, it took us
only five months. This is because, and I believe this is the central
message of my speech today, Mexico has made very important changes
in the structure of its economy. Mexico is not yet out of the cold, and
we still cannot declare victory. We lost more than 700,000 jobs this
year and expect to lose another million. The economy fell 10.5% dur-
ing the second quarter of this year. You can imagine the chaos if the
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United States economy lost 10.5% of its GDP. The Mexican economy
faces a very important challenge.
In 1992, we suffered one of the most important crisis in the
world-the debt crisis. But, our economy was structured differently.
We exported oil and little else, and we had a large public debt. In
addition, all the imports that we had at that time were subject to licens-
ing or other restrictions, and our fiscal deficit was 16% of GDP.
Today things are totally different. We have a budget surplus, the
economy is open, we have a more competitive infrastructure, and we
have built the fundamentals that will impel us out of the crisis quickly.
We have two problems. First, we recognize that an excessive depen-
dence on foreign savings is too dangerous for the economy. We recog-
nize that foreign investment is good, and that hot money is not. After
the Mexican crisis, we understand that it is necessary to establish some
control over international capital flow. This requires that we rely to a
greater extent on domestic savings for growth. There are several meth-
ods for doing this. It has been fashionable in Latin America to reform
the social security systems, so as to maximize domestic savings. We
are not yet sure that we can reach this level of domestic savings by just
reforming the social security system-there is Chile, for example. I
think we should make a deeper evaluation as to what extent the increase
in savings in Chile was due to the financial infrastructure that accompa-
nied the reform in social security systems.
The second problem is the risk of falling back into the old way of
doing things. A friend compared this situation to a football team. A
team has a trainer who tells the players to go to bed early, eat right,
and train hard. The team starts winning, but then they lose a game.
The players who did not like the way the trainer pushed them to eat
right, go to bed early, and train hard might then be inclined to say:
"You see, it's not worth it." The same is true for the financial reforms,
privatization, deregulation, and public expenditure control in Mexico.
People ask why keep doing it, if it is not working. But, Mexico must
not give up on reform. We must follow the same path and look to the
future in terms of what can be done to increase domestic savings.
ROBERT HERZSTEIN: I would like to begin my comments by referring
to the announcement of this meeting, which states:
This endeavor will promote new initiatives that will allow each university
to provide a stronger education for the next generation of legal profes-
sionals who will work in the interdependent environment created by the
NAFTA.
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It is a worthy effort to have an annual convocation of legal and related
experts who are dedicated to preparing themselves and others with the
insights and the techniques needed to manage the interdependent envi-
ronment created by the NAFTA.
In light of this goal, I will take a preliminary look at the impact of
increased economic interdependence on the process of regulating busi-
ness activity.
One need only look back to the debates over the United States Loan
Guarantee Program last January and February: Critics in the United
States complained that United States sovereignty had been eroded by the
NAFTA, and that the United States was now beholden to Mexico and
its monetary management. At the same time, proposals emerged in the
Congress to link United States loan guarantees to many unrelated issues,
such as the tariff on wine, extradition matters, drug matters, immigra-
tion, and so forth. All of these linkages, naturally, would have been
outrageous impositions on Mexico's sovereignty.
Not too many years ago, foreign policy speeches by Mexican officials
often focused on the importance of preserving the absolute autonomy of
Mexico. This typically meant economic, as well as political, autonomy.
In fact, it does seem easier to preserve absolute political autonomy if
one also preserves economic autonomy by avoiding interaction with
other countries as much as possible.
On the United States side, in the post World War H era, one heard
very little talk about sovereignty or autonomy. The primary foreign
policy thrust of United States officials was to encourage international
cooperation, in both the political and economic spheres. Economic
interdependence was welcomed as a healthy goal, and few were con-
cemed with the loss of political autonomy.
During the past decade there has been a reversal of these attitudes.
On the Mexican side, the rhetoric has softened in appeals to autonomy
and sovereignty. President Salinas effectively recast the traditional con-
cept, by asserting that only through participation in the global economy
could Mexico achieve the strength to defend its sovereignty and enjoy
its autonomy. He took the old political symbol of sovereignty and gave
it a meaning more in line with modem conditions. The new concept
enabled Mexico to reduce the role of the state in the economy and to
participate fully in the global economy.
As Mexico is recasting its conception of sovereignty and expanding
its interaction with other countries, in the United States we began to see
greater concerns about the threat to sovereignty resulting from interac-
tion with other countries. The NAFTA debate ignited the sovereignty
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issue with an intensity not seen in a century or so. Ralph Nader and
others have spread the word that the United States is no longer master
of its fate; that, for example, as a result of the NAFTA, we no longer
can set the standards for the food we eat, nor keep plant pests from
entering the United States in trucks driven by Mexican drivers.
Ross Perot voiced strong concerns about the erosion of United States
worker safety and environmental standards. Following the NAFTA
debate, the same critics expressed similar concerns about the World
Trade Organization. One commentator stated:
The Treaty, in effect, pushes many important political debates offshore,
further and further away from the citizens. Increasingly, issues once
resolved through open democratic debate will be decided in the arcane
world of international diplomacy and deal-making, where American citi-
zens are unrepresented and where no rules exist to guarantee accountabili-
ty and democratic access.
This type of rhetoric is still widespread in the United States, and it is
certainly continuing to act as a impediment to the pursuit of open eco-
nomic policies in the United States. A letter from nine Senators, in-
cluding Senator Dole, for example, insisted that Chapter 19 of the
NAFTA (the antidumping dispute settlement procedure), not be included
in the agreement reached with Chile. In fact, the letter indicated that
the Senators would welcome the elimination of Chapter 19 from the
NAFTA. Sovereignty concerns have also led to the current efforts in
Congress and the Executive Branch to create a novel United States
judicial mechanism that would review WTO appellate decisions, in order
to insure that United States autonomy has not been excessively eroded.
Coping with these issues of interdependence and autonomy is a task
for lawyers. I would suggest this as the topic for a future conference
for the law schools that are trying to work the legal implications of the
NAFTA.
We have to start with the inescapable reality that any program that
opens trade and investment between countries creates a legitimate inter-
est of each country in the other country's regulatory policies. When
trade and investment is opened between Mexico and the United States,
Americans suddenly become very interested, for example, in how Mexi-
co regulates its banks or its worker safety. When economic interests
begin merging, they generate a legitimate interest in regulatory programs
and business practices. To the extent that we can demonstrate that these
domestic regulatory concerns can be effectively dealt with in a free-trade
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context, we will be able to destroy the widely perceived link between
trade liberalization and loss of autonomy.
Is there a loss of legal sovereignty? In the WTO and the NAFTA,
any country can always refuse to go along with any external demand
that the agreement or the dispute resolution bodies impose on it-it
simply has to pay a compensatory price. But, there is no legal imped-
iment to the full exercise of all its options. Through trade and invest-
ment, interests have been created within each country which make it
desirable to accede to certain demands that might be made by another
country. In that sense, there has been a loss of autonomy, but it is the
sort of trade-off of autonomy for other benefits that is healthy in any
relationship.
Similar trade-offs occur in most institutionalized human relationships.
In a family, for example, one does not have full individual autonomy
within a family, but the trade-off is the enjoyment of considerable bene-
fits from the relationship. Once one clarifies the problem in this way, it
is possible to consider the institutional mechanisms or instruments for
dealing with joint interests.
Not too long ago, there was much interest in a book entitled, Man-
aging Interdependence. We now face a subset of this subject-Manag-
ing Regulatory Interdependence. This can be accomplished through joint
legislation, which requires a pooling of legal sovereignties, or through
adjudication, which we do to some extent in our dispute resolution
mechanisms. Most of the law review articles on the NAFTA have to
do with dispute resolution. But dispute resolution represents only one
method for managing interdependence, and it is a heavy-handed method,
because it results in decisions about "right" and "wrong." It is hard for
a government to face a determination that it was "wrong."
A third approach is cooperation between regulators, and between
Executive Branch and administrative officials. This is the most promis-
ing method for managing our regulatory interdependence, and would be
especially effective if it is combined with transparency in the domestic
processes of each of the countries involved.
SERGIO LOPEZ-AYLLON: Thank you very much, Mr. Herzstein. We
now move to the south. We have with us Mr. Andres Solimano, who
has a Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technolo-
gy. He is currently the Executive Director for Chile and Ecuador at the
Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, D.C. He is editor of
a number of books and articles on international economics, development,
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Chile and other Latin American economies. He will make his presenta-
tion on the Chilean economy.
ANDRES SOLIMANO: Thank you very much for the invitation to this
interesting and timely conference. I will devote my presentation to
three issues. First, I will elaborate on the recent economic performance
of Chile putting it in the broader perspective of the reform and develop-
ment strategy of Chile over the last two decades. Second, I will discuss
the trade policies of Chile in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, focusing on
the new emphasis given to association to sub-regional and bilateral trade
agreements. Finally, I will highlight some challenges for the Chilean
economy and the process and prospects for hemispheric integration.
Chile follows a market-based development strategy, outwardly orient-
ed, in which the private sector leads the growth process. Market-orient-
ed policies are combined with acceptable degrees of social equity
through a combination of rapid economic growth and targeted social
policies.
The Chilean model was initially implemented some twenty years ago,
in an authoritarian setting, when free market reforms were not fashion-
able in economic policy. Economic reform became gradually more
popular, extending into the rest of Latin America and the former social-
ist bloc in the late 1980s and 1990s. When the reforms began in 1974,
Chile was in an extremely deteriorated condition. Inflation was at a rate
near 800% in 1973. Public finances were completely bankrupt: the
fiscal deficit was 25% of GNP and increasing. International reserves
were unable to finance more than three weeks of imports. The econo-
my was largely socialized and the nationalized sector ran into large
losses. We had a nationalized sector subject to many constraints. Eco-
nomic and political uncertainty was rampant. The political/economic
crisis led to a coup d'etat in 1973 that interrupted many years of demo-
cratic rule.
The policies implemented since 1974 focused on correcting acute
macroeconomic imbalances; opening the economy to international trade;
eliminating micro-economic distortions, and opening many activities to
the private sector through privatization and other measures.
While the first decade of the reforms, 1975 to 1985, was more of a
trial and error period, its positive results came in the late 1980s and
1990s. Between 1986 and 1995, Chile has been growing at an average
rate of 7% per year. The simple mathematics of compound rate of
growth shows that growing at a rate of 7% per year national income
doubles every ten years. This implies a major improvement in living
[VOL. 11:4718
NAFTA CASE STUDIES
standards. The rate of growth of GDP in 1995 was 8.5% and the pre-
diction for 1996 is for growth between 6.5-7%.
Chile's growth is supported by a substantial rate of national savings.
While the national savings rate was around 8% of GDP in 1985, it
dramatically increased to 27% of GDP a decade later, in 1995.
That is an important element of the story because it shows that by fi-
nancing the bulk of the investment and growth effort with national
savings, the economy becomes less vulnerable to adverse shocks in the
volume of foreign financing. Still, I think that a contribution of foreign
savings to the overall savings effort on the order of 2-3% of GDP is
very reasonable.
The external orientation of the Chilean economy is shown by a ratio
of total export to GDP of around 35% in 1995. This is a high number
when compared with very open economies such as Taiwan, Korea, Sin-
gapore and others in South-East Asia.
There has been also an important diversification of the export basket.
Chile is now much less dependent on copper that it was fifteen to twen-
ty years ago. Today, products such as fruit, wine, timber, fish-meal, are
significant items in the export bundle of the country. This overall per-
formance is supported by a stable macroeconomic framework. Inflation
is at a one-digit level. In 1995, inflation was 8% and for 1996 it is
estimated to decline to around 6.5%. The overall fiscal budget has a
surplus, and public savings are on the order of 5% of the GDP.
So, today, the government is not an agent that sucks savings form the
system; on the contrary, it is an agent that contributes, in net terms, to
the overall savings pool of the economy. The balance of payments is
also very strong. We have a level of international reserves on the order
of $15 billion-around on-third of total GDP-a comfortable level to
react to eventual external shocks. The current account of the balance of
payments was roughly on balance in 1995 and it is expected to be in a
small deficit of around two to three percentage points of GDP, in the
years to come, a level that can be easily financed from abroad.
In 1995 there was a record level for foreign investment of $4.5 bil-
lion as approved by the Committee on Foreign Investment in Chile.
The favorable behavior of the Chilean economy is also producing a
positive impact on the social sectors in the last five years as a conse-
quence of rapid growth and also from targeted social policies. Unem-
ployment, at around 5%, is at a record low by Chilean standards. Real
wages have increased steadily during the last five years at an annual
rate of more than 4%.
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I will now touch briefly upon some issues of trade policy and inte-
gration to regional trade blocks. The trade policy of Chile in the 1970s
and 1980s was one of unilateral trade liberalization. The main concern
was not in seeking reciprocity or in entering into the then existing trade
agreements. The focus was on unilateral tariff reduction and the elimi-
nation of quantitative trade barriers. Chile had, in 1973 and 1974, a
tariff level of 100%, on average. Moreover, there was substantial dis-
persion in the tariff structure and a profusion of non-tariff barriers such
as quotas, import prohibitions, initial deposits, and a system of multiple
exchange rates.
An exporter, or an importer, in Chile at that time had to overcome
many bureaucratic and policy barriers to conduct international trade.
The new policy regime of a uniform tariff of 11% and no quantitative
import constraints paid off very favorably in terms of a continued ex-
pansion of exports after 1975.
Now, in the 1990s, Chile faces a different external environment re-
garding trade agreements, with respect to the 1970s and 1980s, as
NAFTA, MERCOSUR, The European Union, and APEC have growing
importance in global trade.
Chile is open to that trend in a pragmatic way, otherwise, the coun-
tries left out of those agreements run the risk of losing access to large
external markets. Chile's association to MERCOSUR is underway; and
it has been a member of APEC since 1994.
An eventual accession of Chile to NAFTA is estimated to create an
expansion of trade with the NAFTA countries of approximately $400 to
$600 million per year. Another benefit of the NAFTA accession for
Chile is a lower country risk, with the ensuing positive effect on the
level of foreign direct investment to Chile, which is, anyway, at an
historical high. The third benefit of an eventual NAFTA accession is
more intangible and relates to being part of small group of large and
globally influential nations.
Let me turn now, quickly, to some future challenges to the Chilean
economy along with some thoughts on hemispheric integration.
A first economic priority for Chile is to maintain the current dyna-
mism and pace of expansion of GDP. As the economy is at near "full
employment," there are no pools of unemployed labor to draw upon to
expand output. This requires that Chile accelerate the rate of growth of
total factor productivity and improve the quality of the labor force
through education and training.
It is also important for Chile to maintain an adequate level of invest-
ment, say around 27-28% of GDP to support a long-run growth rate of
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6.5-7% per year. In this perspective, infrastructure investment is a key
sector given its strong influence on other types of investment.
It is important not to forget the fundamentals that are behind the
growth record of Chile. These are macroeconomic stability, external
economic orientation, a high national savings rate, a favorable invest-
ment framework to private initiative, and a climate of social peace.
A main source of growth dynamism in Chile is exports; to preserve
that dynamism, they have to keep growing and diversifying in terms of
products and places of destination. Also, the component of value added
in the total export bundle has to increase. Another priority for Chile is
institutional reform. These are part of a second generation of reforms.
In its first generation of reforms, Chile made significant progress in the
privatization of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, the State turned its
public finances from deficit into surplus. There is still much to be
learned on how to improve that State's capacity to deliver social services
in areas such as education and health. Another related challenge is to
improve income distribution patterns without harming private investment
and economic growth; our prosperity has to be shared and expanded.
The fruits of progress and modernization have to reach to the most
vulnerable groups in the population.
There is a vision of hemispheric integration that arose from the Mi-
ami Summit that sees the whole Americas integrated in the early 2000s.
The road to that end might entail linking and coordinating several sub-
regional trade agreements as building blocks of a global hemispheric
trade block. For that vision to become reality, many economic and
political obstacles will have to be overcome as integration will take
place among economies of very different size and weight in the global
economy. The old North-South divide may probably reappear in many
guises with the NAFTA and MERCOSUR as their respective gravitation-
al centers. The eventual opening of the NAFTA to Chile will be an
interesting test of this. In any case, economic progress and development
in the Americas for the years to come will have its engine in economic
integration and in the expansion of global trade under predictable rules.
SERGIO LoPEz-AYLLON: Our last speaker is Mr. Enrique Gelbard,
who is graduated from the University of Toronto. He serves as a senior
international economist at the Royal Bank of Canada. He is also a
lecturer at the University of Toronto. He will present his position on
the Canadian economy and the NAFTA.
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ENRIQUE GELBARD: I will go through a series of slides in my pre-
sentation. Before I turn to the issue of Canada's experience with the
NAFTA and with free trade in general, I would like to provide an over-
view of the Canadian economy and of Canada's economic outlook for
the next three years. These are three sources of strength in the Canadi-
an economy.
The first one is the increased international competitiveness observed
during the last five years. This is evident when looking at manufactur-
ing productivity in terms of output per person. The drastic increase
observed can be attributed to three main factors. The first factor is the
substantial deregulation measures implemented by the federal govern-
ment. The second factor is the implementation of the Free Trade
Agreement between Canada and the United States. The third factor is
the generalized adoption of new technologies in several companies.
The increase in competitiveness can also be observed by looking at
the evolution of labor costs. We can see in the chart that, for the first
time in several years, United States labor costs exceed Canadian labor
costs. Another factor underlying the competitive advantage of the Cana-
dian economy at present is the low value of the Canadian dollar. The
blue line shows that the actual value of the Canadian dollar is below
that value that makes Canadian goods equal in price to United States
goods. Essentially, a cheap Canadian dollar makes Canadian goods
more attractive to both domestic and foreign consumers.
The second source of strength underlying our outlook for the Canadi-
an economy is stable economic growth over the next three years. All
major regions of the world are expected to grow at rates of about 2.5%
or more and we do not foresee a recession in the industrialized world
until late 1997.
The third source of strength in the Canadian economy is the consoli-
dation of a low inflation environment. In recent years, Canada's infla-
tion has dropped from an average of 4-6% in the 1980s, to an average
of 2% in the 1990s. We anticipate that this trend will continue and that
the Bank of Canada will meet its targets of maintaining inflation within
I and 3% per year.
We do acknowledge some risk for the outlook of the Canadian econ-
omy. One of them is a high level of public debt. In the last five to
six years, the share of public debt as a percentage of the GDP has in-
creased. The second risk is a high level of foreign debt. Canada has a
very high level of foreign debt and that debt has increased substantially
in the last few years, mainly as a result of high government deficits.
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In a comparison among seven countries, Canada stands out as the
most indebted nation. There is also some remaining political uncertainty
as a result of the political situation in Quebec. But, we anticipate that
the political situation will improve over the next few weeks, and there-
fore do not see a high risk of Canadian disunity.
On the whole, we believe the strengths outweigh the risks, and we
see Canada growing as fast as the OECD countries in the next three
years. We also anticipate a low inflation environment with low interest
rates in Canada, as well as a stronger value for the Canadian dollar.
Interest rates are expected to decrease from a level of about 6.5% to-
wards 5.5% by the end of 1996. The spread between Canadian and
United States rates is also expected to narrow as a result. We also
anticipate that by the end of 1996, the Canadian dollar will increase in
value to between US$.75 and US$.78. Underlying this outlook is a
positive assessment for the current account balance and the fiscal situa-
tion.
Before addressing Canada's experience with free trade and the
NAFTA, I will begin by providing some background. Currently, Cana-
dian trade is heavily biased towards the United States. Approximately
75% of Canada's trade is concentrated in its bilateral relationship with
the United States. By looking at the evolution of Canadian trade over
the last decade, one can see a marked increase in the share of Canada's
trade with the United States. Most of these changes are attributed to
the Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement, signed in 1988 and implemented
on January 1, 1989. In the last few years trade with the United States
has risen from below 70% of total Canadian trade to reach 75% of total
Canadian trade. In a study done earlier this year we compared produc-
tivity trends between sectors that were not liberalized and sectors that
were liberalized by the Free Trade Agreement. One of the study's most
interesting results is that productivity growth in liberalized sectors far
exceeded productivity growth in other sectors. This confirms that the
Free Trade Agreement has had a positive effect on Canadian produc-
tivity. These results only apply to about one-quarter of the Canadi-
an/U.S. trade relationship because the remaining sectors were already
under free trade; that is, before 1989, most of Canada, trade with th
U.S. was already liberalized.
Canada's trade with Mexico is small by comparison with Canada's
trade with other partners, however, trade between the tvo countries is
growing rapidly. This trend is quite interesting because, despite Mexi-
co's financial situation this year, Canadian trade with Mexico continues
to expand. Furthermore, in 1994 Canadian direct investment in Mexico
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more than doubled. This applies to investment in textiles, automobiles,
metal working, finance, and telecommunications.
Our overall assessment is that trade among NAFTA countries is
rapidly increasing, particularly between Canada and the United States,
and Canada and Mexico. Additionally, Canada and Mexico are trading
similar products, the largest component of which is machinery and
equipment.
Looking at the results of the NAFTA so far, we see that Canada's
trade with the NAFTA countries is growing faster than Canadian trade
with other parts of the world. Overall, the outlook is for a slowdown
in trade and investment flows between the United States and Mexico
this year, but a resumption of growth between 1996 and the year 2000.
The value of Canadian trade with its NAFTA partners is expected to
almost double in less than five years. This can be seen by the expected
increase in the interregional trade's share in total trade. These trends
parallel the experiences of other countries in Europe and South America
after the formation of sub-regional free trade areas.
In assessing NAFTA's sectoral impact on Canada, we see that some
labor intensive activities, like textiles and leather, are being relocated to
Mexico. This is accomplished by direct investment flows that are going
south of the border. We also see improved export and investment op-
portunities for Canadian industries in the areas of telecommunications,
engineering, high-tech sectors, and services.
The Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States, for
the first time in any free trade agreement, included a chapter that specif-
ically deals with financial services, provided national treatment to other
countries, and further liberalized some of the activities of banks and
insurance companies across borders. The NAFTA expanded these privi-
leges to Mexico. As a result, over the last two years we have seen an
increase in cross-border financial flows. These activities are very strong
in the areas of trade finance, project finance, underwriting of securities
and foreign exchange transactions. In addition, Canadian financial insti-
tutions have acquired United States and Mexican financial services com-
panies.
Finally, the liberalization of Mexican agriculture in the NAFTA is
viewed favorably by Canada. We have already observed a rapid in-
crease (between 30-40%) in exports of Canadian oil seeds and grains to
Mexico in the last two years.
I would like to leave you with three concluding comments. First,
that the Canadian economy is relatively well-positioned for respectable
growth in the next few years. Second, that the Free Trade Agreement
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has been tremendously successful, despite the many cases brought before
dispute settlement panels and the fact that regional trade laws of partici-
pating countries have not been adjusted accordingly. And third, that the
ongoing financial crisis in Mexico is not likely to have a detrimental
effect on the long-term integration process among the NAFTA countries.
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PANEL III
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAS
AL LEWIS: Thank you to our hosts for their kind invitation to moder-
ate this distinguished panel on telecommunications in the NAFTA re-
gion.
We have the following panelists with us today. On my right is John
Blakney, an attorney at Frazier & Beedy in Ottawa, Canada. Mr.
Blakney has seventeen years of experience in the communications sector.
He will share his thoughts on the Canadian perspective.
We are also honored to have Jonathan Doh, a member of the Interna-
tional Business Faculty at the School of Business Administration here at
American University. Before coming to American University, he worked
at the United States Department of Commerce.
On my left is Hugo Concha Cantu. Since 1994, he has been a re-
search fellow in the Jurisdictional Research Institute at the University of
Mexico.
Before we begin let me share just a few thoughts on what the
NAFTA has meant to AT&T and some of the important aspects of the
NAFTA from a telecommunications perspective. One of the most impor-
tant provisions in the NAFTA from our perspective is the reduction of
tariffs on certain telecommunications equipment. For AT&T, in the first
year, that meant a savings of $40 million. Some of the other telecom-
munications related aspects of the agreement include the framework that
was established for intellectual property protection, the elimination in
Mexico of foreign investment restrictions on certain enhanced service
providers, as well the sections in the agreement that liberalize the provi-
sion of enhanced services.
From our perspective, the one aspect of the agreement that could
probably be strengthened is basic telecommunication services. Right now
the NAFTA does not address basic telecommunications services. We will
hear more about this from our panelists.
JONATHAN DOH: I will focus my presentation on four areas which,
together, are having a profound impact on the evolution of the telecom-
munications industry in this hemisphere. First, I will discuss two key
forces-technological innovation and deregulation/privatization-that are
driving the evolution of the telecommunications industries and how they
are regulated. Second, I will describe how these drivers are transforming
the industries in two significant respects-the disparate industries are
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converging and the intermediaries previously required in order to access
services are being removed. Third, I will assess how these changes have
and will influence United States telecommunications trade policy in the
NAFTA, Chilean Accession, FTAA, WTO and Global Information Infra-
structure talks. Last, I will draw some conclusions regarding how these
developments are likely to affect the architecture of the global telecom-
munications industries of the future and how the role of government
regulation will fit into this mix.
Telecommunications is a unique industry in terms of trade policy,
because in addition to the normal concerns about tariff and non-tariff
trade barriers, there is the overlay of national and regional regulation. In
many countries, customer premises and enhanced services had been
liberalized, however, basic services were not. That is now changing for
two reasons. Rapid advances in technology are pushing the limits of
governmental capacity to regulate and contain the framework of en-
hanced and basic telecommunications services, forcing governments to
accelerate the pace of deregulation. The second set of forces is deregula-
tion and privatization. Governments are aggressively moving forward
with deregulation because of technological pressure but also as a means
to ensure better quality and more comprehensive service for consumers
and especially business users. For example, we now have legislation in
the United States to allow long distance carriers, local phone companies
and cable operators to participate in each other's businesses.
Internationally, we see countries ranging from Cote d'Ivoire to Paki-
stan, Latvia to Nicaragua, selling off state-owned telephone monopolies
to private companies, often consortia that include a United States part-
ner. These drivers are also leading to two key transformations in the
range of services provided by individual providers and the manner in
which services are delivered--convergence and disintermediation.
Technological innovation and deregulation are allowing telecommuni-
cations firms previously in only one line of business (basic service, long
distance, equipment, cable) to engage in other businesses, causing a
convergence in the range of services that one firm or consortium may
offer. Looking at it from the United States perspective: Sprint, MCI,
Bell Atlantic, Southwestern Bell, U.S. West, and even AT&T are all
competing for the range of services that will now be possible for each
to provide.
If this is true, why would AT&T breakup its various operations along
the lines of a services company, a telecom equipment company and a
computer company? Two explanations are relevant. First, one of the
reasons AT&T wanted to spin off the equipment company is so it can
1996]
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
bid for purchases by what would otherwise be competitors of AT&T-a
possibility that results directly from the deregulatory trends I outlined.
Second, while AT&T writ large is getting out of areas of the computer
equipment business, this is not necessarily a "telecommunications" busi-
ness per se, so convergence in telecommunications doesn't mean com-
peting in all of the equipment or services markets upon which telecom-
munications depends or which, in turn, depend on telecommunications.
Further, there is no evidence that the company is not as interested as
ever in being involved in all areas of services, including wireless ser-
vice, which was greatly enhanced by AT&Ts purchase of McCaw Cellu-
lar.
Even within telecommunications, not all companies will try to com-
pete in all products and services, but rather each company will review
its strategic options and compete in as many businesses as it feels it can
earn a better than average return. For example, MCI has now bid to the
FCC on the last remaining direct-to-home broadcast license. Moreover,
companies will not necessarily attempt to build competencies in these
new areas from scratch. In fact, just the opposite. Individual companies
will develop a range of relationships, partnerships and alliances to serve
particular needs at a particular time. These connections may or may not
last longer than the particular job or project. They may, in fact, dis-
solve, to be reconstituted in another context.
Deregulation and advances in technology have permitted consumers to
circumvent traditional intermediaries. In so doing, they obtain additional
and, in some instances, superior services such as direct-to-home satellite
broadcasts or Internet communication. This phenomenon, which we have
seen in the banking and financial service industry, in turn, puts pressure
on companies to accelerate innovation and adjust marketing strategies
that focus on a different kind of consumer with a whole different set of
expectations of what is possible in terms of service. This is especially
seen in the growth of services provided by the Internet and the range of
options available to the consumer over one network.
The convergence of industries and companies and the removal of
traditional intermediaries are two important characteristics that in-
creasingly define which entities offer telecommunications products and
services and how they are delivered. These forces-technological innova-
tion and deregulation, convergence and disintermediation-have caused
an evolution in United States telecommunications trade policy in the
NAFTA, FTAA, and in global fora such as the WTO and Global Infor-
mation Infrastructure initiative (GII).
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In the NAFTA negotiations, the United States pressed for comprehen-
sive liberalization of enhanced services, opening of corporate network
services, standards harmonization and compatibility, and government
procurement. It should be mentioned that telecommunications trade poli-
cy is more than simply removing explicit regulations on the provision of
telecommunications services and equipment, but also must include treat-
ment of government procurement and standards issues, both of which
can have significant implications in facilitating or restricting both equip-
ment and services access.
Because the pace and extent of deregulation in the United States was
not entirely clear at the time, Mexico was already liberalizing according
to a very specific schedule, and the Europeans were putting pressure on
the United States in both services and equipment liberalization in the
WTO, the United States did not push for coverage of basic telecommu-
nications. In the Chilean accession negotiations, however, United States
negotiators are pressing for "NAFTA plus" because United States indus-
try wants to lock in Chile's already wide open market and set precedent
for future hemispheric negotiations to ensure United States companies
can take full advantage of significant market potential throughout the
hemisphere.
Sensitivities about domestic regulation have subsided now that it is
clear that the United States is undertaking another significant step in
opening up services here in the United States, providing the conditional-
ity and reciprocity to extend access to countries through negotiations.
Liberalization of basic under FTAA (but not under WTO) could give
United States firms an advantage over European/Asian firms in compet-
ing for the basic operating services in Latin America as they privatize.
At the very least, the willingness of the United States to move forward
in the regional context could give added impetus in the WTO where
things do not typically move at lightening speed.
Under the WTO, a general "standstill" commitment providing no
erosion of coverage of basic access was provided, leaving significant
work for future efforts. In fact, the telecom negotiations are underway to
extend GAIT disciplines to basic services, and, as mentioned earlier, the
position the United States is taking in the Chilean accession talks helps
reinforce the point in Geneva and vice versa.
In the GIl initiative, sensitive issues, such as privacy, cultural protec-
tion, and control over airwaves, make rapid progress unlikely. The
United States/Canadian conflict over so-called cultural protection is a
good example of this problem and will continue to present some ten-
sions in regulations of especially broadcast media. Hence, telecommuni-
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cations trade policy is adjusting and adapting to these new conditions in
the kinds of agreements we seek and where we pursue our market open-
ing strategies.
The major forces driving United States telecommunications trade
policy will increasingly come from private sector developments, con-
stantly forcing governments to play "catch up." During the transition to
more complete liberalization, however, governments will be forced to
take decisions that will advantage some segments of services over oth-
ers, creating continued pressure for mergers and other forms of coopera-
tion between and among firms. At the very least, because of the current
distribution of powers and products, any liberalization will inherently
benefit some players over others.
The parallel with financial services is close here, as banks have prob-
ably more to benefit than securities firms from the repeal of the Glass
Steagal regulatory prohibitions in the same way as cable companies may
have more to benefit from the coming deregulation because, at present,
they are relatively more limited in what they can offer.
Ultimately, national governments will realize that, as is the case in
financial services, their ability to regulate an increasingly global industry
is limited, and initiatives such as the GII, only with less hype and more
pragmatism, are necessary to harmonize (not necessarily regulate) global
telecommunications standards, allowable services, and general industry
structure. The only long term role for government is to ensure access,
for example, to remote areas, which will be less of a problem in years
to come because of deregulation and technological advances in the area
of wireless communication.
The second role for government is in the area of preserving security,
preventing unauthorized access, and, potentially, piracy. Here, the course
is much less clear as to how governments and private associations can
cooperate to limit these unwanted consequences of the phenomenon I
have described.
In sum, the infamous decision of Judge Harold Green which led to
the first break-up of AT&T more than a decade ago, set off a series of
reverberations for regional, national and global telecommunications com-
panies and governments. These reverberations are still being felt in the
form of continued deregulation in the United States, privatization abroad,
and competition and innovation within and among telecommunications
sectors and companies. These developments are, in turn, being felt in
telecommunications trade negotiations and regulatory coordination which
seek simultaneously to: (1) achieve a manageable transition toward more
open and accessible telecom markets for products and services; (2) pro-
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tect unauthorized and potentially disruptive access to telecom networks;
and (3) encourage continued creativity and innovation that will facilitate
growth and expansion not only in the telecom industry, but in all of the
other sectors of our economy which depend increasingly on telecommu-
nications to develop and deliver the high-demand products and services
of the future. This is one tall order, but with intelligence and foresight,
close industry/government cooperation, and a little bit of luck, it is
attainable.
JOHN F. BLAKNEY: Unlike the previous speakers, I am going to
focus on the actual words of the Telecommunications Chapter. In doing
so, I will not talk very much about trade and telecommunications equip-
ment in the North American context.
Briefly, the equipment industry has been globalized, technology is
standardized, there are few patents that matter, and software is a global
issue. In global terms, the equipment industry is dominated by a few
multinational companies. Northern Telecom, headquartered in Canada, is
one of them. Northern Telecom was the first to supply low-cost, digital
office switches to the newly divested regional Bell companies operating
in the early 1980s.
Chapter 13, the Telecommunications Services Chapter, is essentially a
highly articulate flow-through from a number of provisions of the Free
Trade Agreement. I will look at the Telecommunications Services Chap-
ter as essentially that kind of flow-through, and will look there for the
context of the creation of the FTA Telecommunications Provision. I
will try to compare that context to the differences in the economic envi-
ronment of both Mexico and Chile, in terms of what the implications of
the new Telecommunications Chapter means to them.
I will also give you a brief summary of Chapter 13. It may seem
odd that the chapter is in the NAFTA, because it appears to have less
to do with trade in goods and services, and more to do with placing
constraints on domestic public utility regulatory policies in individual
countries. One might ask what domestic public utility policies have to
do with the flow of goods and services across borders. In light of past
international trade agreements, Chapter 13 is a foreign element. It does
not have anything to do with the tradition of liberalizing international
trade rules.
My third point, however, is that I believe we see here a little acorn
in the telecommunications provisions of the FTAA and the NAFTA by
becoming a significant presence in future arrangements between States
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which are designed, in one sense, to codify a commonality of domestic,
economic or regulatory policies.
The objective of Canada and the United States was partially to avoid
any backsliding into a more dirigiste or interventionist world, and par-
tially to set a standard by which future agreements on microeconomic
policy might be made to be incorporated into future comprehensive,
bilateral arrangements. In other words, I look at the Telecommunica-
tions Chapter as alien to the tradition of international trade negotiations,
and at the same time, see it as the seed of a new form of agreement: an
agreement that discloses an increasing convergence, or meeting of the
minds, between different states as to the limits to which interventionist
microeconomic policy should go in particular sectors of the economy.
In hindsight it is perceived as a win for the two parties, but from a
forward looking perspective the two parties have managed to agree on
some pretty detailed rules about how to treat telephone companies, and
how to demonopolize an industry. They further agreed on how to trans-
form a public service, quasi-state enterprise, into just another industry.
In fact, that is the transition that Canada and the United States were
embarking on at the time of the negotiation of the FTAA in 1987. In
my written remarks, I indicated that there were only slight differences
between Canada and the United States in their view of telecommunica-
tions services in 1987. In the United States, the telecommunications
services industry had completely lost all strategic significance. It was
regarded as a sector ripe for development of sustainable competition.
More significantly, this sector faced dramatic antitrust restrictions
through the 1982 divestiture arrangements which emphasized structural
solutions. The terms of the consent agreement involved breaking up
companies and providing for nondiscriminatory access to competitors.
Canada, in 1987, was not much different. Perhaps one could argue
that Canada continued to attach a greater strategic importance to its
telecom sector; and that nation building through telecoms was still a
factor in policy making; and that Canada attached slightly greater social
policy significance to the telecom sector. But, these were not substan-
tial differences. The overlap in domestic policies was virtually com-
plete. As a result, it became very easy for Canada and the United
States in 1987 to define a set of rules for the regulation of the respec-
tive telecom carriers as part of an international trade arrangement.
Canada got an opportunity, finally, to codify, without United States
objection, foreign investment limitations in the telecom sector. What the
Americans got out of it in 1987, perhaps to a lesser degree than other
sectors, was essentially a codification of base-line policies for telecom
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competition in Canada, which would ultimately provide for greater for-
eign investment opportunities and would ultimately result in a more
efficient sector. At the same time, however, it would provide demon-
strable evidence to the world that Americans were not alone in believing
that the telecom services sector was a key sector for demonopolization.
This demonopolization was achieved largely through the kinds of instru-
ments that one sees applied in competition law.
The principals that were adopted in 1987 are articulated in Chapter
13. These are nothing new to Canadians and Americans, but are largely
foreign concepts in virtually every other regulatory jurisdiction. The
principle of nondiscriminatory, transparent system interconnection rights
is the first concept. This requires the monopoly carrier to break up its
network services. This results in the opportunity for customers to
choose from alternative suppliers who have the right to land their net-
works on the former monopolist's network at particular points of pres-
ence, in order to create complete, switched call paths or private network
paths. Transparent, reciprocal, nondiscriminatory interconnection rights
are a fundamental proposition of Chapter 13, and flowed from the dives-
titure of AT&T into local and long distance companies.
A second important development in Chapter 13 are affirmative obliga-
tions relating to pricing. The agreement says that telecom services
pricing must reflect economic costs. This is close to a microeconomic
domestic policy principle. Private leased circuits must be available on a
flat rate basis, because flat rate, private-leased circuits provide the bulk
product that support an arbitrage-based resale competition in both Cana-
da and the United States.
Another domestic competition policy measure involves certain limita-
tions allowed for access terms within defined parameters. In other
words, some public utility discriminatory regulation option is still avail-
able. These have to be reasonably necessary in order to receive the
safeguard public service responsibilities, or protect public network tech-
nically in good integrity. Frankly, this section has yet to result in any
substantial amount of dispute view between Canada and the United
States, again, because we are basically in an agreement on the underly-
ing regulatory mechanics to achieve the principles. But, there may well
be reason for Mexico and Chile to reflect upon the extent to which
these principles might limit the development of their telecommunications
systems.
Other provisions involve essentially opening up the market for en-
hanced or value added services. Neither Canada or the United States,
has foreign ownership rules that apply to businesses that are resellers,
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who add on enhancements such as software intelligence, or service bu-
reaus who provide 976-type telephone services. These are the specific
types of policy constraints built right into a trade agreement.
I will now address key environmental differences between Canada and
the United States. Based on my proposition, Canada and the United
States moving into the 1987 FTA, had essentially the same telecommu-
nications services environment. Our systems were completely integrated.
We used the same technology, delivered the products the same way, and
had essentially the same regulatory environment. Indeed, executives
cross-fertilized each country's companies to a high degree, and we
bought from the same set of suppliers.
There were, however, some fairly significant environmental factors
between Canada and the United States, on one hand, and Chile and
Mexico on the other. In fact, one could extend this dichotomy to in-
clude, Canadian and United States equals, all of the OECD countries,
and on the other hand, everyone else. First, in Canada and the United
States, an extensive commitment to wire line, microwave and fiber-optic
type infrastructure already existed. By the time of the agreement, an
extensive, highly engineered infrastructure had already developed.
Chile and Mexico essentially still have an undeveloped telecom infra-
structure. Despite its implications, this provides the great advantage of
providing far more choices with regard to technological selection. Cana-
da and the United States have low telecom prices. Chile and Mexico
have very high telecom prices for services, particularly for long distance.
In 1987, Canada and the United States had near universal penetration
rates, both with respect to residence and business customers. Although
Chile and Mexico are expanding their penetration rates, they continue to
be relatively low. In Canada and the United States, by the mid-1980s,
the available economies of scale and scope in the telecoms services
sector had largely been exhausted; whereas, in Chile and Mexico, there
remains potentially tremendous economies of scale and, therefore, pro-
ductivity gains are still to be realized. Another difference is that in
Canada and the United States private ownership of telephone utilities
predominated for a long period of time, and in the 1980s there was
extensive development of private corporate networks, while in Chile and
Mexico, there is state or quasi-state ownership. In the case of
TELMEX, privatization still involves a social contract with the privatiz-
ing government.
The final institutional difference is that in Canada and the United
States, telecoms were regulated by an independent regulatory agency. In
the United States, the predominate regulatory agency in the 1980s was
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the antitrust courts. The FCC is reasserting itself. In Canada we have
had a mix of antitrust and regulatory policy, where our regulator, the
CRTC, has, over the last few years at least, become a de facto antitrust
regulator. Chile and Mexico, however, have essentially state price con-
trol.
What are the implications of those differences with respect to provi-
sions of NAFTA? First, I do not necessarily suggest that there are
negative implications. But, the implications are that the model of the
Telecommunications Chapter is at least suitable for a highly developed,
advanced, ubiquitous telephone industry, which has already been subject-
ed to substantial competition.
Chapter 13 will, however, help jump start Chile and Mexico towards
the local telecom competition and productivity we have achieved in
Canada and the United States. I question, however, whether the codifi-
cation of Canadian and United States rules will necessarily provide the
degree of flexibility during the transition that is required to assure that
the social benefits of universal telephone service are available for all
consumers in each country. There are many economic advantages to
universal telephone service. Anyone who has spent a week in Mexico
City can see the enormous potential for substituting telecommunications
for automobiles.
My last comment relates to the codification of foreign ownership
restrictions in Canada. In 1987, we announced policies just prior to the
finalization of the FTA to provide us the opportunity to grandfather
foreign investment limits in firms which we consider to be strategically
important. Those provisions were enacted in the early 1990s.
We have the new Telecommunications Act in Canada which specifies
that foreign voting share ownership in our facilities-based telecoms carri-
ers cannot exceed one-third of the voting shares; and that the company
boards have to be 80% Canadian; and finally, that effective control,
defined by corporate law, must lie with Canadians.
Some would suggest that we have, in fact, moved backwards in codi-
fying foreign investment limits, given the globalization of the industry.
To date, however, I believe that the effect of codifying these rules has
been to create some certainty for foreign investors wishing to participate
in larger Canadian telecom carriers. Indeed, the three primary long
distance carriers in Canada have foreign investment and
cross-fertilization within them. Sprint Canada has adopted the name of
an American company through a licensing arrangement, by which Sprint
U.S. has taken out a 25% nonvoting position in Sprint Canada. AT&T,
perhaps much to its chagrin, has become a substantial investor in anoth-
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er long distance carrier, Unitel Communications, which recently was put
into what amounts by a bank receivership and equity workout by a bank
consortium when it found that it did not have any customers to buy the
company, and the existing investors were going to walk away from their
guarantees of close to a 650 million dollar line of credit. Nevertheless,
we have certainty, with respect to our foreign investment limits in the
telecom sector in Canada within a reasonable range. It is comparable to
that of the United States. I would expect both Canada and the United
States to move through the post-Uruguay Round so as to establish that
limit worldwide, and then increase it. To date, in Canada, voting share
limits have not proven to create a substantial impediment to technology
transfer.
One major point that flows from the FTA arrangement is that from
now on, Canada and the United States and any other participant in these
agreements will not be able to force technology transfers. Indeed, tech-
nology transfer will now have to be freely negotiated between private
companies, and that substantial, but non-controlling ownership position is
expected to be sufficient inducement to ensuring adequate technology
transfers, with respect to telecommunications between Canada and the
United States. For the time being, it may well prove to be a sufficient
inducement for other countries that participate in the NAFTA.
AL LEWIS: Thank you, John. In particular, thank you for your com-
parison of the United States/Canadian markets with those in Mexico and
Chile. I would like to invite our friends from Mexico and Chile to
respond.
HUGO CONCHA CANTU: The North American Free Trade Agreement
has been the latest demonstration of the importance of telecommunica-
tions in world trade. Besides the great expectations created by the nego-
tiation of such an important agreement, in terms of the huge market that
was to be created and the significant shift of the world economic dy-
namics, the NAFTA clearly displayed the new agenda of international
trade, the thematic content of what has been called the new trade theory.
In this new perspective, technological changes applied to communica-
tions at distance--telecommunications--for a new governmental agenda.
In this presentation, I will first review the NAFTA provisions regard-
ing telecommunications that have affected Mexico. Second, I will de-
scribe the different policy and legal transformations that have taken
place in Mexico.
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Despite its novelty, the NAFTA international negotiation counted on
important precedents. The most important source used was the GAIT,
because in its Uruguay round, an annex on telecommunications was
elaborated upon, which served as the model for the corresponding
chapter in the NAFTA.
The NAFTA presented two basic differences with its originating
source, widely seen as innovations. First, the NAFTA included a broader
and deeper vision of the telecommunications area, but at the same time,
with a comparatively less restrictive focus. It is true that the correspond-
ing chapter is basically a set of regulations, but it is obvious that the
NAFTA negotiators dealt with fewer positions and interests than GAIT
negotiators did. Also, as a second difference, the NAFTA not only fo-
cused on the interests of the providers, but included a list of users'
rights in accessing public networks, which provides the basic telecom-
munications services.
There are three chapters in the NAFTA related to the telecommunica-
tions industry-the chapter on services, the one on standards, and the
chapter specifically on telecommunications. All these sections, as a
whole, created a complete strategy for liberalizing and interconnecting
North American telecommunications industries, both from the perspective
of the providers as well as from the perspective of the users.
The services chapter establishes the basic principles that apply to
telecommunications, specifically the principle of non-discrimination.
According to the NAFTA, governments are not only precluded from
establishing barriers to entries by setting obstacles to prohibitive incorpo-
ration or licensing requirements, but also they have the obligation of
providing most-favored nation status.
Within the standards chapter, the corresponding provisions require the
harmonization of standards in various industries, including, specifically,
telecommunications. This has been qualified as one of the most dramatic
commitments from the United States perspective, because standards
setting has usually been an area left to the private sector in the United
States
The core of the Treaty regarding telecommunications, Chapter 13,
focused on enhanced services, equipment and private networks, and
established multiple policy objectives that the governments involved
have to implement, as well as specific restrictions on the governmental
actions and regulation. Among the different concepts included in this
chapter, the access to public networks is fundamental.
Among the multiple policies governments seek to implement, the first
one is the complex task to support and encourage the free flow of infor-
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mation across nations. Article 1302-4 requires that the parties guarantee
freedom of movement of information to persons of other NAFTA coun-
tries. This freedom includes movement of information in networks that
are run solely within a corporation as well as access to information that
can be read into and stored in machines. This shows the particularities
of the sector, in which competition is an odd one, because the provider
is bound to guarantee access to its own competitors. Article 1302-5,
allows limitations on the free flow of information by establishing the
right of governments to ensure the security, confidentiality, and privacy
of subscribers and their communications.
The principle of non-discrimination is another fundamental point that
is translated in effective policies. Although in the case of telecommuni-
cations it is covered extensively in several areas, Article 1302-8 specifi-
cally defines the term for this topic.
Crucial issues, such as transparency of information and regulations
which referred to the use of and access to the public network, are cov-
ered by provisions in Articles 1306 and 1304-5. This core section of the
negotiation was included, because limiting access to and use of public
networks is one of the most recurrent ways that governments have en-
couraged discriminatory restrictions. If a foreign company has to relocate
their services into a country or obtain additional licenses and permis-
sions in order to gain access to public networks, the time spent and the
resources required would be extremely high.
This problem is first addressed in Article 1301-1, which defines the
scope and coverage of the Chapter. Article 1301-2 is the most definite
statement on the topic, by establishing the guarantee of access and the
use of rights to broadcasters and cable system operators, but without
including measures for the distribution of radio and television program-
ming. Article 1302-6, however, establishes an exception to the rule. This
Article states that the only conditions a government may impose on
access and use are those considered as "necessary to safeguard the pub-
lic service responsibilities of common carrier services or to protect the
technical integrity of the networks." Furthermore, Article 1302-7 lists the
measures that can be taken in such exceptional cases.
The goal of liberalization is clear and well-articulated in the Chapter.
Article 1303 limits the regulation of providers of enhanced services;
these are provisions taken directly from the United States experience
with Telephone companies and Cable Television services. Articles
1303-1 and 1303-2 emphasize that governments may not discriminate,
impose common carrier requirements, or hamper the entrance or exis-
tence in the market of enhanced services providers.
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In what we can call an unusual provision with consequences far more
deep and serious than what could have been considered during the nego-
tiations, Chapter 13, in its Article 1301-3 and Article 1305, allowed the
parties to determine which entities could operate as common carriers,
and, at the same time, to maintain or designate monopoly providers for
basic services. The argument for such a measure was the inefficiency
that could be avoided by taking advantage of installed capacities, spe-
cially when resources or investment are not easily obtained. The counter
provision was to set limits by requiring each party to adopt anti-compe-
tition legislation that limit the ability of entities to engage in anti-com-
petitive behavior. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in Mexico.
The last issue that should be mentioned is the inclusion of interna-
tional standards in telecommunications. Article 1304 emphasizes stan-
dards regarding measures affecting terminals and other equipment that
attaches to the public network. A United States policy, establishing that
anything that can be attached to the public network is permitted as long
as it does not harm the network or its users, was practically translated
into Article 1304. The exception provides for measures needed to pre-
vent harm or interference with the network and its users, or to ensure
compatibility with other users. For such purposes, Article 1304-7 es-
tablished a Telecommunications Standards Subcommittee of the Commit-
tee on Standards-related Measures, created earlier in the Agreement in
Chapter 9.
Under the NAFLA, Mexico not only lowered its tariffs to incredible
levels in comparison to the ones that existed before, but also implement-
ed standard certification of equipment to enable its partners not to repeat
certification procedures for exports already certified in other countries.
Some important issues were left out of the negotiations, including the
operation of basic services (the services that constitute the base of the
communications network, primarily terminal-to-terminal telephone lines).
All three countries decided to reserve on those services. As one author
suggests, this could be explained as a remaining vestige of the Cold
War era-when fears of too much foreign influence in crucial areas
dominated the policy environment. In the case of Mexico, although
historically explained in terms of strong nationalistic protections even at
constitutional levels, the reservation, however, adopted unusual dimen-
sions, and counteracts many of the liberalizing provisions by maintaining
the basic monopolistic structure in the country.
Another relevant exclusion from the NAFTA were broadcast and
cable distribution of radio and television programming. Article 1309
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explicitly left open the possibility for future agreements on basic tele-
communications services by requiring previous consultations.
Obviously, the effects and overall impact of the Agreement on the
involved nations, have been and will continue to be very different for
each participant. In the case of Canada, for instance, as it has been
mentioned, the NAFTA provisions will have little additional impact,
because of the earlier U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the high
level of Canadian-United States trading activities.
It is precisely the opening of Mexico's markets, and its liberalizing
policies, that has constituted an interesting focus for Canadian and
United States telecommunications companies. However, the NAFTA
meant much more for Mexico than just a new policy or strategy. The
NAFTA meant, for Mexico, the consolidation of a new economic and
political model to replace nationalistic, highly protectionist policies that
survived for more than half a century. The Agreement provided for
sound transformation of Mexican structures and policies, which have put
United States companies in good position for investment. In an estima-
tion made by AT&T, the company saved $40-$45 million in equipment
tariffs, during the first year after the NAFTA's implementation. Just in
the case of contracts for installation of fiber links between cities and
switching systems, the same company received more than $150 million
in the same period of time. By the time of the NAFTA implementation,
the Mexican telecommunications market was estimated at $6 billion.
The most outstanding change in telecommunications in Mexico has
been the change of its legal apparatus. This process began outside the
scope of telecommunications, with the redefining of principles relating to
State size and functions. In other words, the telecommunications revolu-
tion has been a part of a general modernization strategy that started in
1986, when Mexico joined the GATT, and that was actually consolidat-
ed in 1989, under the Salinas administration.
In order to understand the context of this specific transformation
taking place in Mexico, it is important to recall that many different and
specific policies were implemented before, in order to materialize this
modernization project. All of these changes had a direct repercussion, or
were later repeated, in the telecommunications area. Among these trans-
formations I can mention a sound reduction of the state size by the
privatization of more than 2000 companies and entities of every kind, a
fiscal budget reduction, the implementation of a fiscal legislation reform,
the successful negotiation of a continued debt program, and the
establishment of an open trading economy. These changes were embod-
740 [VOL. 11:4
NAFTA CASE STUDIES
ied in new policies of legislation, like foreign trade and investments,
economic competition, and, just recently, telecommunications.
The first measure in telecommunications, took place in 1990, when
the huge state monopoly of telephone services, TELMEX, was privat-
ized. TELMEX was ranked number nineteen among the twenty-five big-
gest telephone industries in an economic survey that appeared this week.
At the same time, facilities were given to investors to develop competi-
tive industries, like the cellular telephone systems, and plans were made
to open the local services and long distance market in a gradual way to
other investors, including both nationals and foreigners. These plans
were transformed into specific commitments two years later, during the
NAFTA negotiations.
Telecommunications services included a wide range of services, but
all of them were derived from three basic groups or structures: antenna
broadcasting systems, cable networks, and satellite facilities. In Mexico,
when the telephone company was privatized, the real potential competi-
tor for this kind of service was actually another monopoly-the televi-
sion and entertainment company, TELEVISA, owner of the only cable
television services, CATV. It is true that the government had a televi-
sion company that was also privatized in 1993, but it is not a cable
company, just a normal wave-broadcasting electro-magnetic system.
The expectations were as high and as fast as the results. From the
privatization of TELMEX in 1990-94, the number of phone lines in the
network rose close to forty , and innovations in the system made it
possible to take the phone service to more than 64,000 communities in
rural Mexico.
Another important element introduced by the government was the
launch of two satellites, Solidaridad I and II, and the creation of
TELECOM, the State enterprise in charge of their management. Not-
withstanding the amazing developments of cable communications, the ca-
ble networks present more benefits, both from a provider perspective, by
counting on common or selective terminals, and from a consumer per-
spective, by offering an extremely wide range of services, especially
with the new fiber-optic element.
This was the setting before the NAFTA. The NAFTA negotiations, as
we have seen, made significant inroads into an area traditionally highly
regulated in international trade. Two basic elements were introduced:
non-discrimination and free flows of information. The NAFTA provi-
sions regarding telecommunications industries combined the theoretical
goals with practical decisions to achieve open access with technical
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harmonization. The results in these two years have shown the interest
and the support for the steps and the direction taken.
With the markets open, the modernization program in Mexico focused
on a deep and radical change in its telecommunications legislation in
order to increase competition and investments. The network moderniza-
tion program has a five year term for completion, and costs more than
$13 billion.
The first significant legal change regarding telecommunications was a
constitutional amendment, Article 28, that took place on March 5, 1995.
Telecommunications, via satellite, had been considered "strategic areas."
That is, areas that could only be exploited and developed by the federal
government in order to safeguard public interests, along with other activ-
ities like postal services, telegraphs, oil, gas and its products, basic
petrochemicals, nuclear energy and electricity. According to the amend-
ment, railways and telecommunications via satellite are excluded from
this classification and classified within the "priority areas," in which the
state remains in control, but can grant concessions or permissions to
private entities. On June 7, 1995, the new federal legislation for tele-
communications was published in the government's official journal,
replacing the corresponding sections of the former Act.
The main objective of this Act is to create a modem and open regu-
latory environment for the telecommunications industries. Therefore, in
Article 4, the means of telecommunications are defined as the
radioelectric spectrum, telecommunications networks and satellite com-
munications systems. In the next article, services like the installation,
operation and cable maintenance, are considered public services, and are
subject to comply with ecological and urban regulations. Chapter II is
dedicated specifically to concessions and procedures, considering they
are vital aspects of fair competition and increased investment. In other
sections, however, State responsibilities regarding social coverage is
heavily regulated. In brief, the new regulation attempts to achieve har-
monization between the necessary public responsibilities regarding basic
services, and a new open scheme for real and firm development of the
area.
Mexico, like most open economies, has recognized that competition
offers the best way to ensure that the changing technology is fully trans-
lated into better economic conditions. Its transformations, though unique
in nature and characteristics, are better understood within global liberal-
ization trend that encompasses the three biggest economies. For instance,
in the United States, after a long sustained prohibition, a debate is tak-
ing place to see if long distance carriers and regional Bell companies
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will be able to compete freely with cable-television operators; in Japan,
the government is trying to reduce NTT's grip on the local network;
and, in Europe, the Commission in Brussels is determined to create a
single market in telecommunications services.
Still, there is a long way to go. Formal changes in legislation should
be accompanied by a strong will to modify the attitudes of individuals
and governments. Openness is not going to be achieved without substan-
tial support. On June 20, 1995, the incipient Federal Competence Com-
mission surprisingly accepted the purchase of 49% of capital of the
Cable TV enterprise by the telephone giant.
With this sort of merge between monopolies-the telephone giant and
the television cable network-chances for introducing immediate compe-
tition for telephone basic services seems to be nothing but good wishes.
The explanation for this contradictory decision is not an easy one.
Besides the hackneyed argument that it is the best way to take advan-
tage of installed capacity, and that these companies are already limited
on the restrictions they could impose on the consumers or users of their
networks, multiple interests were combined in such a result. TELMEX
holding is a Mexican company, with more than 70% of its capital con-
trolled by foreign stock markets. This means that the survival of this
corporate giant, a complex melting pot of interests, will eventually be
disarticulated slowly and gradually.
Although the speed of the telecommunications revolution is uncertain,
the direction of change is clear. Governments can delay progressive
telecommunications reform, but cannot prevent it. In Mexico the revo-
lution is underway and will continue to grow in unparalleled dimen-
sions.
AL LEWIS: Now we will hear from the Chilean representative about
one of the most exciting telecommunications markets in the region.
JORGE ROSENBLUT: Only a few years ago, when we gathered to dis-
cuss free trade, the subject of telecommunications was not on the agen-
da. The debate was only about trading traditional, hard, tangible prod-
ucts. This was especially true for countries like Mexico, Chile, and
other developing countries. But, this conference is an example of how
things are changing and how rapidly they are changing.
The telecommunications revolution has been the technological basis
for the rapid expansion and diversification of world trade. International
trade refers less and less to trade of material goods, and more and more
to trade of technology, services, images, symbols, lifestyle-in short,
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culture. This includes telecommunications, transformed into the special
vehicle of this new trade, leading the so-called "globalization" of today's
world.
In many ways, development of telecommunication has led to a pro-
cess of globalization, which requires that public policy be readapted.
Telecommunications has experienced, in the past few years, a strong
globalization process. At least in Chile, this has been the most dynamic
process in economy. That is why today one cannot reflect upon interna-
tional trade without putting the subject of telecommunications on the
agenda.
The developing countries, in general, and Latin America, in particular,
have not been absent in this revolution. In the region, this is an indus-
try that has expanded rapidly in the last few years as a result of privat-
ization. For our country, this is a great opportunity to take a mayor
leap forward in the development process.
I am going to start out by describing the Chilean experience. I had
the privilege of being the Under Secretary of Telecommunication for
seventeen months. During those seventeen months, we had a tremen-
dous breakdown in the opening of our industry. The developments of
the telecommunication industry over the last few years, especially re-
garding the deregulation of markets, has been very successful. While our
national economy has grown at 7.4% per year over the last seven years,
telecommunications has grown about 20% per year in the same period.
Our telephone network now has the potential of about 14 lines per
100 inhabitants. We has 4.5 lines per 100 inhabitants in 1989. The
cellular phone system has 120,000 subscribers and they continue to
expand rapidly. The process of awarding concessions for Personal Com-
munications Systems (PCS) is quite advanced, and we hope that the
service will be available in Chile at the end of 1996. We also have
300,000 subscribers to cable television and we have operators in the
same geographic area.
Anyone can do almost anything in Chile regarding telecommunica-
tions. Today we have vertically integrated companies operating in sepa-
rate subsidiaries, and we have completely integrated what goes with the
services. In the future, PCS and cable television will be integrated as
well. There are absolutely no restrictions on either foreign or local
ownership. Participation is permitted in all of the participation of the
industry, regardless of which sectors one participates in.
Our telephone network is one of the few in the world that is 100%
digitalized. It is one of the few in the world where anybody can
choose, at the touch of three buttons, any of the eight carriers on a one
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call basis. You can make one call on one carrier and then the next call
on a different carrier, depending on the prices that very day for the
destination that you want. You are not caught by signing with one
company, although you can still do that.
There are five international operators in Chile. We have Bell South,
Southwestern Bell, Bell Atlantic, Sprint, and a Spanish telephone compa-
ny. I met with Bell Canada and Telecom Canada last year because of
their interest in Chile. We looked forward to having them in Chile.
But, unfortunately, some other company jumped in between us and got
their partnerships.
The immediate effect of deregulation on the consumer, especially in
the long distance sector, is that the price of international calls has
dropped dramatically-60% in twelve months. Calling from Washing-
ton, or Ottawa, to Santiago, which cost $2 per minute a year ago, costs
$.25 per minute today. We finally have telephone traffic from Brazil,
Argentina, and Bolivia to United States and Canadian destinations day
and night. We do not stop this at the border because it costs $4 to go
from those countries to the United States or Canada. It costs $.25 for a
private line between Argentina and Chile, or Brazil and Chile. It is not
our traffic, and we are happy that our companies are benefiting from
that traffic.
Deregulation has already affected Chile's economy tremendously,
considering how prices have fallen. The effect of the price revolution,
because of the price elasticity, has had a tremendous impact on the ban.
In the last twelve months, the recorded number of minutes in long dis-
tance has increased from 8.2 million minutes per month to a 10.5 mil-
lion minutes in the first half of 1995. Private traffic between mayor
hotels or companies in Argentina or Bolivia, that are using Chile as a
go-between, is not recorded traffic. This is for our companies, and we
do not want, or need, to record it.
Chileans are much more integrated into the world today than they
were twelve months ago. It was the change in public policy that
opened the door to competitors and private agents, who have improved
the efficiency of the system in which we did not have a dollar of State
ownership, or any telecommunication concern, five years ago. Today,
Chile is a country more open and competitive internationally, because of
its efficient telecommunication infrastructure. Lower prices were not the
goal-it just happened.
What we see is that this tremendous telecommunication infrastructure
provides for our service industry and for our banking industry. We see
the competitive edge to win businesses when they are fighting their
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neighbors abroad. If we can save them 1% over competitors because of
easier, low cost, more efficient telecommunications, then this is real
progress.
Of course, these changes in the telecommunications industry are not
free of risk. But, in Chile we say, at least in telecommunications, if
you have to ask for permission or for forgiveness, I would rather ask
for forgiveness. We just went ahead with the deregulation. It is not
easy to admit, in good faith, what regulatory role the State should play
to comply with this new open market. We are learning by doing.
But, the real lesson that the Chilean experience provides is how the
country has managed, despite its historical disadvantage, to create such
an opportunity through the development of telecommunications.
I also absolutely agree with the preparation of basic services. We
have to open basic services. The story that we learned thirty years
ago, the days that I used Marx and Lenin books at my university, was
how to plan society. Obviously, basic services provided for, and such
economies of scale, that it had to be all in one hand. Today, one
switch equipment for 100,000 lines could fit in that big pile. The econ-
omies of scale have come down dramatically. I agree with opening
basic services, and in Chile it is already open. Today, BellSouth is
operating in cellular, Southwestern Bell is already in basic services, and
Bell Atlantic, MCI, Sprint are looking to enter as well.
Since 1987, when we opened the market three administrations ago,
technology has changed and increased dramatically. There is no limita-
tion today on opening the market and integrating technology into our
system. We will have PCS service in mid-1996.
In Chile, we are offering bids, and the people that want to invest
more quickly can get a license. We have run a fiscal surplus for the
last eight years in a row.
There is not price control whatsoever, unless there is a monopoly and
there is only one supplier. This exists only in the local services sectors,
the rest is in competition. Public policies similar to ours are being
applied in other countries, with much the same result. Bolivia, for
example, just sold their telecommunication long distance operation for
$600 million. This exceeded the most optimistic expectation. This
enormous injection of capital will improve and increase telephone cover-
age and improve Bolivian integration. This is occurring more and more.
We hope the same will be true in Argentina.
The move from State ownership of supply services to private supply
of services, is risky one for the bureaucracy. When the services are
private, they cannot be regulated. It is for the market to decide. The
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model that Argentina followed is very legitimate. In this model, only
one company takes all the local service.
The development of telecommunication is making the world into a
network, which has no center or periphery. Perhaps the paradigm of
this network is Internet, where all of the users surf without a center.
This is the great opportunity that the revolution and expansion of tele-
communication opens to us. Because, once we are integrated, truly and
freely, into the world network of trade, we will finally be able to place
all our intelligence, imagination and idealism into the world of products
and services. Telecom represents, for our countries, the possibility of
taking a shortcut to the road of development.
Latin America has prepared tremendously for the prospects of the
telecommunications industry, and in doing so, is facilitating the develop-
ment of free trade in the Americas. Countries that still have very old,
burdensome regulations of inefficient state-owned monopolies are now
the exception. The barriers to entry for the international operators are
minimal. We only ask those coming in to respect the laws and to com-
pete honestly and in good faith.
I do not think the telecommunications sector will be an obstacle in
the process of negotiating and signing free trade agreements like the
NAFrA. The countries of South America have advanced, in this re-
spect, even more rapidly than those in the north. Telecom, like technol-
ogy and industry, is called on to be a basis for the expansion of free
trade in America. As a Chilean, I cannot hide the frustration we feel at
the possibility of not being able to make faster progress on the subject
of trade in America.
Chile-its government, ministers, labor leaders, environmental
groups-have high hopes about the possibility of joining the NAFTA,
after the invitation was formally extended at the Summit of the Ameri-
cas in Miami. For a country like ours, which has undergone difficult
experiences in the past few decades and is starting to move ahead today,
joining the NAFTA has been something that drew us together and
united us as a country. Recently, however, the news has not been very
encouraging, as a result of very understandable internal political devel-
opments in the United States. We hope that these are temporary obsta-
cles and that the dream proposed so many times, of reaching greater
integration of the Americas in the exchange of trade, will not be frus-
trated once again.
To finalize, I would like to return to the question I asked at the be-
ginning of the Conference, and state that, when we talk about free trade
in the Americas, developing countries like ours, I am convinced that the
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modernization of telecommunications will be instrumental, not only in
increasing trade, but in reducing the poverty and the abandonment that
still affects our countries. I am satisfied, for that very reason, that the
subject has been brought up in this seminar and I am proud to have
been invited to speak about it.
NAFTA CASE STUDIES
PANEL IV
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF FREE TRADE
CLAUDIO GROSSMAN: Our first speaker, Peter Dohlman, is an expert
on the topic of international trade and government. He has a doctorate
in Economics from Duke University and currently is an economic advi-
sor at the United States International Trade Commission. He has worked
directly on many trade-related investigations. He advises the Commission
on all economic issues before it and he also has very rich research
experience on trade issues. Today we have him on behalf of Commis-
sioner Crawford.
PETER DOHLMAN: Thank you, Dean Grossman. First of all, I want to
apologize for Commissioner Crawford not being able to be here. She
became involved in agency budget discussions at the last minute and
was not able to attend. I share her belief and deep conviction in the
benefits of free trade. The views I present here, however, are my own
and do not, in any way, reflect the views of the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission.
Today, imports are painted as the villain, the credo being that exports
are good, imports are bad, and that the United States is a victim in free
trade arrangements. Far from being a victim, we are the big guys. We
have the strongest economy and one of the most successful trade records
ever. Our exports of goods and services have more than doubled since
1985. We are the largest exporter in the world. Last year we sold over
$650 billion worth of American goods and services abroad.
Exports have increased, not only in absolute terms, but also relative
to our GDP. In 1965, exports represented only 3% of the GDP. By
1985, that figure climbed to about 7%. Today exports are about 10% of
our GDP.
In services, the picture is even brighter. We export about $200 billion
in services abroad now-one-third of all United States exports. The
good news that really never makes the headlines is that, in services, we
have trade surpluses, not only with Latin American countries and some
of the other smaller trading areas, but also with the E.U. and Japan.
Last year, our trade surplus in services was about $60 billion.
The view that imports are bad is especially surprising, given the large
number of studies that have been done on the benefits of free trade. The
Institute for International Economics, several years ago, published a
report that estimated the cost of protection-the inverse of free trade-at
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about $70 billion a year for Americans alone. At the International Trade
Commission, we did a narrower study a couple of years ago which sug-
gested that the costs of protection to the United States economy is gen-
erally about $20 billion. Last year, we completed a study on the United
States antidumping and countervailing duty orders that suggested an
additional cost of about $1.6 billion a year.
These are just static, snapshot estimates. They do not consider the
impact of trade and, conversely, protectionism on growth. Trade has
been the source of an increasing share of the growth of our economy.
The Council of Economic Advisors estimated that nearly four-fifths of
the increase in domestic production of manufacturers between 1987 and
1992 is directly or indirectly attributable to exports. The impact of
trade on jobs has been equally impressive. Our exports of goods and
services together provide over 10.5 million jobs. Another 4.8 million
jobs are provided by United States affiliates abroad. In fact, the Depart-
ment of Commerce estimated that each additional $1 billion in exports
provides about 16 or 17,000 new jobs.
This is just the United States side of the equation because trade is
not a zero sum game. There is another side of the equation, and that is
our trading partners. In many cases, our trading partners are also recipi-
ents of foreign aid. In fact, protectionism is inconsistent with these
foreign policy goals. In the developed world, including the United
States, we have been quite forceful in encouraging developing countries
to modernize their economies, embrace free market principles, privatize,
eliminate subsidies, and drop barriers to imports. But when these coun-
tries begin to produce and export competitive products, they come up
against barriers in the developed world, i.e., protectionism. Commis-
sioner Crawford shared an anecdote with me that one foreign Ambas-
sador to the United States had phrased this way: They put a ball and
chain on you and then tell you to run.
The costs associated with this can be illustrated by an example. A
World Bank study on Bangladesh, which has a per capita GNP of about
$220 billion, receives about $1 billion in development assistance from
the developed world. However, it found that 80% of the exports of
Bangladesh are subject to various kinds of barriers, such as quotas, that
make it difficult or impossible for them to export their goods.
Another example of high costs from these policies is in the sugar
industry. Just today in the paper I saw that the sugar industry fought
off another attempt to eliminate the protectionist barriers in this country.
The costs, by one estimate, suggest that the American consumers pay
about $3 billion more for sugar, based on the quota system we have in
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place. For every job in the United States sugar industry, that is about
$600,000.
Fortunately, our overall record on free trade is pretty good. Everyone
is familiar with the GATT and the successes we have had there. Prior
to the GATT we had tariff levels in this country of about 40%, and
these have dropped to a little below 5%. After the Uruguay Round
tariff cuts are fully implemented, United States tariffs will be closer to
3%.
We were able to go even further in the NAFTA to break down these
barriers, probably because there are only three parties, not over one
hundred as we had in the Uruguay Round. We also were already each
others' primary trading partners-Canada being our largest partner. Un-
der the NAFTA, United States and Mexican trade has accelerated rapid-
ly. In the first year of the NAFTA, we had an increase in trade of
about $50 billion. Notwithstanding Mexico's problems, NAFIA trade
has increased from $86 billion in the first quarter of 1994, to $102
billion in the first quarter of 1995. For example, if you look at specific
products, we have sold four times as many American cars in Mexico in
1994 as in 1993. In the first half of 1995, we had already sold more
cars to Mexico than in all of 1993. We have also been able to main-
tain a large surplus in services with our NAFTA partners. Trade in
services represented about 12% of all NAFTA trade in 1994. The
United States trade surplus with our NAFTA partners in services was
$5.9 billion last year.
I want to address some of the myths that have surfaced regarding the
jobs and trade. The first is that free trade under NAFTA is driving a
large portion of United States jobs to Mexico, creating the need to pro-
tect American jobs from low wage foreign labor, the concern being that
cheap Mexican labor is impossible to compete against. Contrary to
what the critics have claimed, we are not seeing waves of United States
companies moving down to Mexico or net job losses in the United
States. The Department of Labor suggests that we have lost about
38,000 jobs in this country due to the NAFTA. However, the Depart-
ment of Commerce estimated that, in 1994 alone, we were predicted to
gain about 100,000 new jobs due to the NAFTA. Overall, the United
States economy, since the start of the NAFTA, has added more than
three million jobs. This puts the 38,000 jobs lost due to NAFTA into
proper perspective.
In some ways we cannot compete with Mexico at the very low levels
of wages. That is their comparative advantage; but cheap labor is not
the only determinate of plant location and competitiveness. Productivity
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is a huge consideration. In the United States, we are about 5.7 times
more productive in the manufacturing sector than Mexican workers.
Moreover, United States wages are only about 25% of the overall value
of manufacturing output, while, in Mexico, that figure is even lower
than 11%. So what does the other 75-89% of output consist of? It is
made up of capital and factors such as electricity costs, communications,
and better highways; things that will not or cannot shift to Mexico, but
are permanent fixtures of the United States economy.
Will United States firms be enticed, nonetheless, to move to Mexico
by low wages? In fact, United States affiliates in Mexico, after adjusting
for differences in productivity, employ the equivalent of about 100,000
workers in Mexico. This data is three years old, but it is illustrative.
Contrast this with the three million new jobs created in this country
since January 1994.
While the past record on trade has been good on the GATT and the
NAFTA, will it continue in the near future? The free trade debate today
is dominated by fast-track legislation and Chile. But these are arguments
set in the context of two broader issues: first, how wide our trade
agreements should be; whether we should pursue a building-block ap-
proach of setting up regional trade agreements and then create a multi-
lateral trading arrangement from these regional blocks, or just go straight
to the multilateral, as we have done to a certain extent in the Uruguay
Round; and second how deep we should go? In this context, the word
"deep" means how extensive these agreements should be in non-tariff
areas such as competition policy, labor, the environment, and so forth.
One risk of the building-block approach is that more trade is diverted
than created. That can happen even though we eliminate tariffs and
other trade barriers between two partner countries because we keep them
on imports from third countries. The two partners are better off since
they can purchase goods from each other at a cheaper rate, but outsiders
may not be better off. New trade may be created between the two part-
ners, but some trade might be diverted. For example, in the case of the
NAFTA, rather than importing from the E.U., we now have potentially
cheaper sources, after accounting for tariffs, in Mexico or Canada. Even
if producers in our NAFTA partner countries are not as efficient as
those in the E.U., the E.U. producers cannot compete due to tariffs.
Thus, we are diverting trade from a more efficient producer-but more
expensive due to tariffs-to one less efficient but cheaper.
Such trade diversion harms mostly outsiders but can have internal
costs as well. For the time being, the United States has chosen the
building-block approach, and we are not alone. We are participating in
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discussions of the Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA), APEC,
and TAFTA, the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area. In fact, according to
the WTO, the GAIT has been notified of 109 regional trade deals since
1948. Over 30 of these occurred from 1990-94.
Ambassador Kantor, in the context of the Free Trade Area for the
Americas, has talked about the alternative approaches to achieving free
trade. He stated that the United States at this time favors a two track
approach, in which the existing regional trade areas will be built up,
and, as a second track, the United States will focus on issues like com-
petition policy, labor and the environment in the context of working
groups with partner countries. So the United States at this time is favor-
ing a narrower approach, in terms of the number of countries, and a
deeper approach within those regional trade agreements. An example is
the FTAA. The FTAA is illustrative of the types of working groups that
have been set up. There are groups on customs procedures and rules of
origin-rules of origin being a very contentious area which is now being
considered at the multilateral level as well-groups on investments, stan-
dards and technical barriers to trade, sanitary measures, and subsidies.
There is another important consideration in deciding on a building-
block or multilateral approach. Reliance on the building-block approach
may weaken our credibility and our motivation to succeed at the multi-
lateral level. For example, in June 1995, the United States chose not to
participate in a multilateral investment treaty with its WTO partners.
Even worse, the United States has not come to terms on the relatively
non-controversial, from an economic perspective, accession of Chile to
the NAFTA. There is a real risk that if the United States does not act
now to expand the NAFTA, it will be bypassed in the region by other
trade initiatives. As Principal Deputy USTR Charlene Barshefsky said
recently, "If NAFTA isn't open for business, MERCOSUR certainly will
be." If Chile and other countries do not consider the United States a
viable free trade partner, they will form their own associations. The
larger these other free trade areas are, the greater their bargaining power
in any future negotiations with the United States.
Two key issues with reference to how deep we should go are the so
called "blue-green" issues of labor and the environment. There is funda-
mental disagreement over what role these issues should play in our trade
policy. There are some economic arguments in favor of environmental
controls, such as in the case of extra-territorial pollution, but labor is-
sues are far less convincing as motivations for trade barriers from an
economist's perspective. Although trade does appear to have some sup-
pressing effects on low-end wages in this country, this is more appropri-
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ately addressed in a non-trade policy context and, therefore, should not
be a central part of any trade negotiations.
Whether we go with the NAFTA, FTAA, APEC, Western Europe, or
with a multilateral approach, the benefits of free trade are that we open
up vast markets for United States companies, we create jobs, and we
allocate our resources more efficiently to industries where we have a
comparative advantage. Free trade does not mean our economy loses
money to foreigners. It means that foreigners have more dollars to pur-
chase our goods. Free trade is not a concession, as many people feel, to
be granted to foreigners but rather a benefit that we bestow on our own
companies and citizens.
To conclude on an optimistic note, while protectionism is not going
away, I believe that most countries are coming to understand how to
best pursue their own economic interests and in doing so will continue
to drop their trade barriers.
CLAUDiO GROSSMAN: Thank you very much. Our next speaker today
is Raul Urteaga-Trani. Since 1992, he has served as a member of the
Embassy of Mexico's NAFTA office in Washington, D.C. His service
projects include the promotion of Mexico and the NAFTA in the United
States. In his role at the NAFTA office, Mr. Urteaga-Trani was also in-
volved in the negotiations that led to the creation of the NAFTA envi-
ronmental-side agreement, the North American Development Bank, and
the Mexico/U.S. Border Environmental Commission. He brings very
broad diplomatic knowledge to his organization. He spent a year in
Ottawa working on the negotiation and promotion of the agreement.
Before that, he spent four years at the Organization of American States
working on technical cooperation activities. He has an education and
degrees from both the United States and Mexico, in business administra-
tion and urban and regional planning.
RAUL URTEAGA TRANI: The North American Free Trade Agreement
is in its twentieth month of implementation. NAFTA's first year was
characterized by rapidly increasing trade flows: trade among the three
NAFTA countries increased 17%, surpassing all expectations. In 1994,
total trade among the NAFTA members reached $350 billion.
Bilateral trade between Mexico and the United Stateg grew at an even
faster rate of 20.7%, and surpassed $100 billion for the first time. In
1994, trade flows were remarkably balanced: total United States exports
to Mexico amounted to $54 billion, while Mexican exports to the United
States reached $51.6 billion.
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This year has been a difficult one for Mexico. The Mexican econo-
my is in recession as a result of the peso devaluation of December,
1994. Despite the economic crisis, Mexico has stayed with the open
economic course, and remains committed to free market policies and
trade liberalization. The Government and society reacted quickly and
responsibly with an adjustment program that has today put us on the
path of economic recovery. On the NAFTA, Mexico and other NAFTA
partners implemented the second and third rounds of tariff reductions
right on schedule.
As a result, in 1995, the bilateral trade between Mexico and the Unit-
ed States is expected to maintain pre-NAFTA levels. During the first
eight months of this year, Mexican exports to the United States are
actually up 30%, while Mexico's imports of United States products are
down only 7%. But, imports into Mexico of intermediate goals are
actually up by 3.7%. This is, in fact, good news for United States ex-
porters, since about 70% of Mexican imports from the United States are
intermediate goods. This particular trend also shows that Mexican in-
dustry is continuing to purchase technology, equipment and sophisticated
systems in order to compete successfully in the global economy.
One only has to recall the experience of the 1982 Mexican economic
crisis to see the value of the NAFTA. In 1995, our trade balance will
be brought into surplus not through a sharp reduction in imports, but
rather through an increase in exports. Following the 1982 crisis, United
States exports to Mexico dropped by 50% and took years to recover. In
1995, United States exports will remain above their pre-NAFfA levels,
and are positioned to rebound much more quickly.
Meanwhile, the growth of Mexico's exports has played a vital role in
hastening our economic recovery. During 1995, we are experiencing
large increases in our exports. While this export growth is the result, in
part, of a more competitive exchange rate, it would be misleading to
base it solely on this factor. In 1994, Mexican exports were already up
by 17% over 1993, due to increasing competitiveness of Mexican indus-
try. The reversal of our trade deficit has helped Mexico to dramatically
cut our current account deficit, which was one of the leading factors
that trigger the financial crisis of December 1994.
It is also a clear sign that the NAFTA is continuing to promote
growth in production partnerships between the United States and Mexi-
co. Mexico's trade with the United States differs from trade with the
rest of the world in that a substantial portion of it takes the form of
intra-industry and intra-firm trade. A large part of the growth comes
19961
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
from production partnerships where goods are manufactured in factories
in both nations, with each factory adding value in what it does best.
In 1995, the NAFTA is providing a source of stability and a sense of
permanence for the creation of strategic alliances and joint production
ventures. This is benefiting workers and businesses in both of our
countries.
That is because co-production with Mexican firms offer higher United
States content than goods co-produced anywhere else in the world.
Through co-production, we work together to produce more goods that
would otherwise be produced elsewhere. Together, the NAFTA partners
can produce more competitively than any other region of the world.
As a part of the NAFTA package, the three NAFTA partners agreed
to create a North American Environmental Commission as a part of the
environmental side agreement of the NAFTA. The work of this Com-
mission focuses on cooperation between the three countries on issues
dealing with environmental protection and effective enforcement of do-
mestic legislation. The Commission cannot supersede the authority of
Federal or local environmental agencies in any of the three countries,
but the complaints it receives from citizens, NGOs and governments
regarding environmental compliance could be made public. This in turn,
strengths the Commission's role in advising governments in solving
environmental problems.
Environmental problems along the border have in recent years gained
more prominence in both countries. This attention, and yes, the alloca-
tion of resources to deal with the most serious environmental problems
have also come about in part because of the NAFTA.
Under the NAFTA, Mexico and the United States also created the
North American Development Bank (NADBank) and the Border Envi-
ronmental Cooperation Commission (BECC). NADBank's mission is to
provide financial assistance to environmental projects that are certified
financially and environmentally by the BECC. Both institutions are
being funded equally by Mexico and the United States The NADBank is
being capitalized with $450 million over four years. Annual install-
ments of the Bank's paid-in capital from both the Mexican and the
United States treasuries are available to the bank since 1994.
This year, BECC has started the process of identifying and certifying
projects along the border. The implementation of the first set of pro-
jects is likely to happen in 1996. Communities on both sides of the
border have been active participating in public meetings where open and
franc discussions shape project priorities. The work of these institutions
is just beginning, and even though critics have suggested otherwise, is
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remarkable that BECC and NADBank were able to be fully operational
and ready to assist border communities in just over a year since the
beginning of the NAFTA implementation.
In closing, I would like to reiterate Mexico's firm commitment to
environmental quality, and to the NAFTA and economic integration
through trade and investment liberalization. Central to this process is
the strengthening of our institutions; both at the international and domes-
tic level, as they represent two sides of the same coin. Clear and pre-
dictable rules are essential to business development, environmental pro-
tection and to economic growth.
Mexico has undertaken the challenge to modernize and democratize
its institutions. I strongly believe that the path toward liberalization,
which includes privatization and deregulation measures, will continue to
improve our legal framework to ensure transparency and certainty to
both national and foreign investors.
The partnership forged through the NAFTA has proven both strong
and flexible in the face of economic crisis. It is providing a strong
framework and foundation for future economic growth, environmental
protection, prosperity and competitiveness among the countries of the
North American region.
CLAUDIO GROSSMAN: Our next speaker is Dean Luis Riveros from
the School of Economics and Business of the University of Chile. Dean
Riveros started his studies at the University of Chile where he got a
Masters of Science in Economics, and a Ph.D. in Economics from the
University of California at Berkeley. In addition to academia, he has
extensive expertise in international economics. He worked for the World
Bank between 1984 and 1991, were he worked as a specialist in labor
economics and econometrics. He is widely published, including over six
books and 19 articles in academic journals. He is a well-respected inter-
national consultant for the World Bank, the IDB, USAID, and OECD.
His experience is not limited to this hemisphere, but also extends to
Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.
DEAN LUIS RiVEROS: First of all, I would like to thank you for the
invitation to this very interesting discussion about the NAFTA issue. I
would like to divide my presentation into four parts. First, I would like
to revise what has been the recent evolution of social and labor market
indicators in Chile. Second, I will address how I see the NAFTA impli-
cations for labor and social issues. Third, I would like to discuss the
policy issues regarding the NAFTA negotiation. Finally, I would like to
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indicate some ideas I have with regard to the challenges for the policy
making in Chile, in connection with the NAFTA negotiations and in the
social sector.
We heard how well the Chilean economy is doing. This is absolutely
true. In the social sector, though, we have to be more careful, because
markets work very well in many areas, but many economies do not
reflect the real effect of growth and economic expansion, in terms of the
social sector. Growth, between 1990-94, has occurred at 30% by this, I
mean the accumulated growth rate. The ceilings of expenditures, which
is basically the expenditure of the fiscal sector of the government on
social programs, has expanded to 35%. The unemployment rate dropped
from 8-5% between 1990-94. Our estimates at the University indicate a
stable unemployment rate of 5.5% in Chile. We are basically working at
what the economists call the natural rate of unemployment.
It is important that real wages grew to an accumulation of 18% be-
tween 1990-94, with a 2-3% yearly growth rate. Finally, poverty de-
clined between 1990-94 from 40% to about 29%. Keep in mind that
places like New York, Baltimore, and Newark have a poverty rate
which is between 20-24%. There are some indications that, in places in
the south of the United States, for instance, poverty also runs very
high-around 30%. One may argue that poverty levels in Chile would
not be much out of line with respect to that observed in parts of the
industrial world. However, it is still an apparently high level relative to
the country experience and political aim. There also prevails the impres-
sion that, even under this important economic expansion in Chile, the
reduction in poverty is small. There is an elasticity here. We should
relate the GNP growth with poverty reduction, which is only 0.3%. This
indicates that every 10% increase in output leads to a decline in poverty
for at least three percentage points. Personally, I think we can do better.
Chile needs more effective policies to address the issue of poverty,
particularly considering that the figures just mentioned are an average
for the country. There are regions in Chile where poverty reaches levels
well above the national average. For instance, the 8th Region, where
poverty runs at around 40% of the population, or the 9th Region, with
quite similar levels. There prevails an important challenge with regard to
social indicators, and I believe we tend to exaggerate economic progress
with regard to macroeconomic indicators, but without lending proper
attention to the social dimension. We indeed need more micro policies
regarding the social sectors, particularly in connection with the labor
market.
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With regard to the likely effect of the NAFTA on the Chilean econo-
my, specifically on the social dimension, I must refer to expected labor
market outcomes. All our estimates, obtained from an ad-hoc model
prepared at the University of Chile, indicate that there will be no impor-
tant total effect in a longer term context. Import expansion may be a
little greater than export expansion in the short run, but, as new exports
resulting from trade creation produced by the NAFTA are included, the
balance of payments will exhibit much better results in the long run.
Our model also indicated that there will be no substantial change with
regard to employment levels. There will prevail an important change in
terms of increasing or decreasing employment at sectoral level, without
implying any important effect in the aggregate. This implies the occur-
rence of a significant labor mobility across industries and regions of the
country. The model also predicts an increase in real wages of about 1%,
in the short run, and 11% in the longer term, figures that cannot be
characterized as of crucial importance.
The direct effect of the NAFTA in terms of the level of output, the
level of employment, and the level of real wages will not be significant.
This leads us to our final objectives: creating jobs, increasing wages,
and improving social welfare. I think we will experience some increases
in wages, but this will depend on the social policies implemented. There
will most likely be an important effect on the social sector, including a
reduction in poverty.
The most important effect of the NAFTA in our country, I believe,
will be the employment and output achievements at the industry or
regional level. There will be, of course, restructuring;-a recomposition
of the output between industries and regions. This will likely be an
important policy issue because it will demand labor mobility between
regions and between industries. This will require us to face that prob-
lem, at least in the short-run, with some specific social policies. But
overall, I do not think that the NAFTA will have an important and
direct effect in terms of output and employment.
The NAFTA, of course, will have some impact in terms of invest-
ment, although we already have a very high rate of foreign investment.
We are one of the most successful and least risky economies in the
Third World. The NAFTA, therefore, will not necessarily bring us more
capital. What we would like to have is more capital in the area of me-
dium and small-size enterprises. This an area where we need to develop
an important effort in order to jump to a stage of development charac-
terized by exports with a greater valued added.
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The third point I want to discuss is the negotiation issue. There are
two important ideas here. The first is the idea of creating a parallel
framework by which countries are committed to enforce their current
labor and social policies, subject to the framework provided by the
International Labor Standards. While we do not have a problem with
this, we do have a problem with the idea of negotiating institutional
regulations or the legal framework, because, in our view, labor market
regulation will be driven by social reality, historical tradition, and cultur-
al tradition. I think it is better to keep a broad legal framework con-
cerning common labor standards, so that countries are able to fulfill
obligations within their limitations, and the reality imposed by institu-
tional constraints.
The second issue concerns the social dumping argument. This sug-
gests that, in countries like Chile, and in order to attain better trade
results, labor costs are maintained artificially low. This is a cause of
unfair competition with the less-skilled labor in the industrial countries.
This argument is substantiated as follows: in the United States and Can-
ada unskilled labor in manufacturing represents a cost (including wage
and non-wage payment) of about $15 per hour, whereas in Chile the
equivalent labor represents an hourly cost ranging between $2 to $2.20.
Many think this $13 cost differential is basically the result of intentional
policies.
A second argument in support of the idea of social dumping relates
to the presence of a large informal sector in Chile, which is basically
unregulated as a result of a very liberal legal framework, and constitutes
a source of cheap labor, as well as a mechanism to drive the formal
wage down. If this issue is not resolved by means of appropriate legal
reform-according to this view-it will be the source of unfair labor
competition.
In my opinion, the evidence on labor costs is a little controversial.
The usual rate, the labor cost difference of $2 to $15, more or less,
notably declines when using a purchasing power exchange rate. In fact,
this leads to a cost differential of about $10 per hour. In addition, if
labor costs are standardized by the difference in labor productivity,
which is a significant one, particularly in the case of manufacturing,
then the total labor cost differential between Chile and the United States
and Canada amounts to only about $5. This difference can basically be
explained by differences in capital, quality of investment, and technolo-
gy. The real impact of labor costs on total production is minimal. In
Chile the share of labor in the total cost of manufacturing is about 1%.
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The cost differential, or the wage differential, between the two countries
is not very significant.
Chile and Latin America are less concerned with flexibility, and,
therefore, have traditionally regulated their labor markets more heavily.
Circumstances in the informal sector are on the contrary. The informal
sector, to a large extent is the result of regulation in formal areas, be-
cause that sector provides a lot of labor spillovers into the unregulated
sectors, in both the rural and urban sectors.
There are many issues involved in creating a more liberal labor mar-
ket. We are currently revising the Labor Law in Chile in order to pro-
vide more room for collective bargaining. The hope is to improve the
framework for wage and non-wage negotiations into the enterprises. But,
we do not want to over-regulate as has traditionally been the case in
Latin America in terms of job security and wage indexation. This is
another issue which basically restricts labor market responsiveness to the
demand for economic adjustment.
There are several instances where conditions in developing countries
are such that lifting labor market regulations would lead to lower
informalization costs and to producing smaller, informal sectors. Labor
markets can be highly efficient and competitive, without the need of
substantial state intervention, but in connection with good, supportive
social policies.
How we face the NAFTA policy changes is also an issue for consid-
eration. There are three concerns in particular. The first is improving
labor market responsiveness to meet the changes in economic conditions
in the world environment. The second is reducing the social costs of ad-
justments, which will take place as a result of shifts in production and
employment. And, third, the emphasis of the NAFTA's positive effects
in terms of productivity, wages and poverty. Chile has done everything
right on a macro-level, but there is a lot of work to done on the micro-
level, in terms of social policies. The focus should be expanded to in-
clude policies regarding training, labor mobility and unemployment
insurance. These policies should include short-term measures for re-
sponding to the needs of the poor, and the broad needs for economic
adjustment in response to trade policies.
The tradition of intervening in the labor market to protect the poor
has been altered. Today labor market results are essentially complement-
ed and supported by a set of social policies that focus on the needs of
the poor. This type of policy is essential when allowing for free market
forces to reallocate labor and stabilize living conditions.
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CLAUDIO GROSSMAN: Our last speaker is Dr. Pierre-Marc Johnson.
Dr. Johnson is a physician, an attorney, a former Prime Minister of
Quebec, and a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He is currently a
Professor of Law at McGill University, teaching and researching interna-
tional policy issues covering the environment and economics. He has
extensive experience in negotiation and issues related to development,
trade, and the environment. He participated in the Conference on Sus-
tainable Development and was Special Advisor to the Secretary General
at the United States Conference on Environmental Development. He has
been a panelist and participant in many debates concerning trade, the
environment, and sustainable development, as well as authored essays
and articles on a broad variety of issues. Dr. Johnson will publish a
book entitled "The Environment and NAFTA, On Understanding and
Implementing the New Continental Law" at Island Press in Washington
next month. We are very pleased to have him.
DR. PIERRE-MARC JOHNSON: I will address the topic of Canada, the
NAFTA, and the environment, with specific reference to the Parallel Ac-
cord. I will then address the topic of Chilean accession.
Trade between Canada and the United States is the largest single
trade relation in the world, at a rate of $1 billion a day. This should
give you some idea why Canada is in the NAFTA business. Canada is
an economy which exports-a third of the Canadian economy is directly
dependent upon exports. The United States, our neighbor, is the most
powerful country in the world. This is why we favor multilateralism, as
a means of finding allies on various issues.
There are other reasons as well, including geopolitics. The conse-
quence of greater movement of liberalized trade across the world en-
couraged the United States' Congressional tendency for protectionism.
Canada rushed to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States
(FTAA). The FTAA lasted for a year and served as the basis for the
NAFTA.
It is also significant to consider that the Canadian economy is largely
resource-based and resource-dependent. Wood, fisheries, gas, energy,
mining products and agricultural products make up a significant portion
of our exports, and account for our surplus in trade with the United
States. Secondly, Canada is a massive territory with few inhabitants.
One of Canada's basic problems is that it lacks a 100 million person
labor force. Our 27 million people, sharing a common border of 3000
miles with the United States, and the cold of winter contribute to
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Canada's energy efficiency problems. Canada has environmental prob-
lems.
We recently developed relations with Mexico for two reasons. The
first is strictly defensive. We do not like the hub-and-spoke approach of
the United States, which tends to favor bilateral agreements between the
United States and other countries. We like multilateralism because, in
multilateral forums, we can make alliances with others to preserve our
self-interests. Secondly, the new economy and the globalized economy
are about making alliances with stable partners; emerging markets in
Latin and South America, as well as Mexico, are part of that.
In terms of how the NAFTA affects the environmental policy, the
NAFTA text contains five provisions directly related to the environment.
The preamble states that this agreement is undertaken consistent with the
protection of the environment and promotion of sustainable development.
The preamble also refers to the parties' interest in strengthening their
environmental laws. A provision notes that three international treaties:
the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species; the Mon-
treal Protocol on Ozone; and the Basel Convention are to be implement-
ed on the territories of member countries. Even if the implementation of
these international conventions have trade effects, or affect trade, they
have precedence over the NAFTA provisions. It is the paramountcy
principle.
Chapters seven and nine of the NAFTA provide for sanitary and
phytosanitary protection legislation, as well as technical barriers to trade.
In practice, what these say is that the countries of the NAFTA regime
are entitled to adopt legislation so long as it does not contradict the text
of the agreement. The NAFTA text is very close to the existing GAlT
text on "necessary" measures adopted by a party and on
nondiscrimination. For Chapters seven and nine, the burden of proof
provided for in the dispute resolution system is on the complaining
party. Under Chapter XX of the GATT, however, the burden is on the
defending party.
The NAFTA also has a "pollution havens" clause which is essentially
an admonishment of the parties not to reduce their environmental con-
straints to favor investment on their territory. This clause is not
sanctionable and can lead only to consultations.
Despite the fact that the NAFTA and the Parallel Agreements were
concluded so that they would be enforced together, structurally, they are
not linked. This has largely do to with politics. Once the NAFTA agree-
ment was signed, the parties decided not to reopen the text. So they
concluded a totally separate agreement on environmental cooperation.
1996]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Substantively, to look at these issues one must turn toward the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), whose
objectives are to promote environmental protection and the betterment of
environmental measures, public participation, and cooperation amongst
participating countries. NAAEC also provides for a series of self-im-
posed nonsanctionable obligations that relate essentially to conducting
environmental assessments; preparing "State of the Environment" reports;
and promoting economic instruments, environmental education, and
improvement of the environment through public participation.
In the United States, the courts bring some logic to what is often
nonsensical legislation. In Canada, we negotiate compliance; in Mexico,
which has more or less the same kind of legislation, the problem is
enforcement because of lack of resources. The provisions of the NAAEC
essentially set up intergovernmental cooperation to address three issues.
The first is the large cooperative agenda between the three countries.
The agenda is about impact assessment, standard harmonization, scientif-
ic cooperation, trans-border issues, and a North American agenda for
conducting a common position on the global environmental agenda of
the world. The second issue is opening the process to the public. In
practice, an environmental NGO in Mexico can make a complaint that
environmental laws are not being enforced in British Columbia for a
product that has nothing to do with trade between the two countries.
This and many other provisions suggest that there is an opening up of
the procedure for public participation, even though in the case of NGOs
and individuals, this process is subject to a series of restrictions. Individ-
uals who complain cannot fundamentally lead the process to sanctionable
ends. Their complaints lead up to a Commission report meant to act as
pressure on a party.
The agreement also provides for the possibility of one of the partici-
pating governments to make a formal complaint against a government,
because it is systematically not enforcing its environmental laws. That
process, which is the only sanctionable element of this Parallel Agree-
ment on the environment, is of the exclusive public domain. Secondly,
the government has to demonstrate a persistent pattern of non-en-
forcement by the country complained against. The defending party can
use, as a means of defence of its nonenforcement of environmental law,
the fact that this is the result of the exercise of public discretion corre-
sponding to bona fide choices in the allocation of resources. Not every-
one is sued under United States environmental protection laws. There is
an element of public discretion in any kind of application or exercise of
penal law especially in a context of limited resources.
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Different sanctions can be brought if a party fails to comply with the
panel's decision. In the case of Mexico and the United States, these
could be commercial sanctions. In Canada, it cannot lead to more than a
fine decreed by the Canadian courts, once the panel has imposed it.
Finally, the agreement sets up a Council of Ministers to make deci-
sions; a Secretariat, which in practice has most of the power;, and the
Joint Public Advisory Committee, comprised of five persons from each
of the countries, and which advises the Executive Director and the
Council of Ministers on certain issues.
Why are we discussing the environment and trade? I disagree with
those who describe the environment as strictly a social agenda. I think
the social agenda of trade is labor. Environmental issues are not. Envi-
ronmental protection concerns arise in a domain intimately linked with
commerce and trade.
When we talk about enlarging the scope of trade amongst nations and
territories in the world, we discuss the environment, because it is the
right thing to do. Trade amongst nations cannot be increased without
considering the consequences of increased economic activity. It is obvi-
ous that these effects can be quite adverse to the environment. A sub-
stantial United States domestic constituency favors this perception and
the necessity to provide greater protection of the environment.
There is also the argument that internalizing the costs of environmen-
tal deregulation requires that economic equilibrium between the parties
be addressed. When implementation of important legislation is integrated
in production, the chances that the cost of production will increase, as
compared with a producer that does not integrate these changes, are
high. This fact leads to a competitive disadvantage.
Finally, it is important to note that integration at the hemispheric
level will not result solely on the basis of trade. Institutions are needed
to support it. There is no success story of any kind of integration in the
world that lacked a minimal set of institutions. The Environment Coop-
eration Commission, which was set up, is a unique North American
institution.
Chile and Mexico have different stories regarding the NAFTA. There
are similarities, of course, but largely there are differences, including
population, transborder environmental issues, and the fact that it is much
more difficult in the United States to link environmental concern into
trade negotiation in the last year of a presidential mandate than in the
first year of a presidential mandate.
So in terms of Chile and the NAFTA, everyone is looking at the fast-
track bill, which is being discussed now in the House and will land on
1996]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Senator Dole's desk at the beginning of November 1995. This is a pre-
election year. There are a lot of politics, obviously, going on in the
United States and, therefore, Chile's inclusion in the NAFTA is not an
easy question, particularly, given the position of the Republican party,
which wants to delink non-trade issues when considering fast-track. So
there goes the environment. The overall resistance to environmental
legislation within the Republican party appears to control Congress. This
is largely compensated by what seems to have been a bipartisan agree-
ment in the United States on the importance of free trade. There also
appears to be bipartisan agreement that success with Chilean accession is
fundamental to the success of a real hemispheric policy for the United
States. If it does not work out for the immediate future, Canada will
form its own bilateral agreement with Chile. Then, in 1997, after the
presidential election, it may be possible to move forward with the
NAFTA.
CLAUDIO GROSSMAN: I would like to thank the speakers for their
comments. They presented us with all the complexities surrounding the
social aspects of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
negotiations concerning the fast track in the United States. Thank you
very much.
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